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CHAP'l'ER I
INTRODUCTION

"In Europe it is often said that the t heology of hope is neither
a school nor a movement, but a book; 111 That book is Theologie der
Hoffnung, by Jurgen Holtmann.

In Europe no more can be said about the

theology of hope than has already been said by Holtmann.

His work has

become the measure of the school of theology which claims history as its
special province!

So the study here attempted is devoted mostly to that

book in an effort to evaluate and unders t and the contribution it has
made to the contemporary discussion of history and its relationship to
Christian hermeneutics.
Dr. Jlirgen Moltmann is a professor of systematic theology at the
University of Tubingen, Germany.
non-German-speaking world.

His work is relatively new to the

His first book to be translated into English

was Theologie der Hoffnung. 2 The translation was made by James Leitch
of Liverpool, England, and is entitled Theology of Hope.3 Since the
publication of this translation Moltmann has become popular in the
theological acadellzy'.

He has written many articles in both German and

1Walter Capps, Time Invades the Cathedral (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1,72), p. 41.
2J~rgen Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung (i'iinchen; Kaiser Verlag,

1965).
3Jurgen Moltmann, Theolog,y of Hope, translated by James Leitch
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967).
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English, as well as another major book.

Moltmann's later works develop

the theme of a "political hermeneutic," or the interpretation of the New
Testament message in terms of political action.

But the foundation for

everything else that Holtmann says is laid in Theology of Hope.
Why is the concept of the theology of hope important?

Because it

is the first systematic theology to appear in recent times that departs
from the two extreme theologies that have dominated twentieth-century
thought.

Moltmann does not think in existentialist categories as do

Rudolf Bultmann, Heinrich Ott, and Gerhard 1'beling.

Nor does he

emphasize secular theology as did James Robinson, Thomas Altizer,
Kenneth Hamilton, and Harvey Cox.

Instead, Moltmann has written the

charter document for what he perceived to be the most actively growing
school of thought.

He wanted to reopen the possibility of learning

from the apocalyptic message of Judaism, Jesus, and the early Church.
But he did not want to settle for a mere description of that message.
He wanted to apply it, in its full biblical context, to action in the
present time, in fact, to a specific program of action.
Time is important for Moltmann.

His schematization is horizontal

rather than vertical, with change more important than permanence, action
more dominant than structure.4 Soterioiogy is ancillary to eschatology,
and the very idea of salvation is corporate and universal rather than
individual or particular.5 But one should not too quickly label Moltmann1s theology as purely "secular." He does take history seriously, but

4 Capps, p. 130.

5Ibid.

3
the nonn of history is the future, not the present.

'I'he dialectical

historical process prohibits such a thing as an ontological seculurn.
In Theology of Hope, Moltmann attempts to reach back to Albert

Schweitzer and the debate about the "Historical Jesus."

He sees the

time of Schweitzer as the watershed of biblical interpretation, the
time when theologians really began to study the Scriptures on their own
terms.

Moltmann has begun, as Heino Kadai has observed, to forge a

language of hope that corresponds to the biblical category of promise,
which makes eschatology a dominant theme of Christian preaching.6
Along with the new emphasis on eschatology, Moltmann presents the
contemporary theologian with a corresponding set of ethical questions.
The Christian must live in history.
guided by his theology.

His approach to history must be

The church must minister to history and teach

its people how to relate theology to it.

Theology of Hope, particularly

the last section, is rich in material for the pastor who wants to teach
his people to confront history with hope, to produce an eschatological
ethics.
Wolf-Dieter V.arsch has swnmarized Moltmann I s theology under four
key headings.

The first is the doctrine of the ultimate time which

Moltmann asserts vis-~-vis Bultmann, whose mai n concern was the
liberation of the subject from objective history.? Moltmann's concept

'Heino Kadai, "History and Hermeneutics," A Project in Biblical
Hermeneutics (Commission on Theology and Church Relations of the
Lutheran Church--t1iiss ouri Synod, 1%, ) , p. 133.
7vJolf-Dieter Marsch, 11 Zur Einleitung: Wohin-jenseits der
Alternativen," Diskussion uber die 'l'heologie der Hoffnung (Munchen:
Kaiser Verlag, 1967), p. 1G.

4

of ultimate time is within the category of historical time.

Secondly,

God's "new act" after the death of Christ, which pushes the reader to
examine history, directs the attention to promises rather than permanence.a Thirdly, God's "apodictic Word," seen as human response to a
divine promise, is part of the historical process itself.' And, finally,
the ethics of criticism, the fellowship of the antithesis 10 causes
Moltmann to seek what he would later call his "political hermeneutic"
of the Gospel.
The thesis here presented attempts to answer the question whether
or not Moltmann's Theology of HGpe, offers an answer to the impasse of
understanding, described by William Hordern as follows:
On the one hand, modern theology recognizes that Christianity
is a historical faith, rooted in events that happened. On
the other hand, when it attempts to show how f~th is related
to historical studies, there is no agreement.

Chapter II analyzes this impasse in detail.

Chapter III analyzes

&ltmann's methodology for overcoming it, the "history of traditions."
Chapter IV deals with Moltmann's philosophy of history gleaned by the
use of his method from the biblical material, describes his eschatology
as well as his debt to Ernst Bloch.

There it moves on to an attempt

at relating Moltmann's work to modern labels on the basis of this one
book.

Chapter V relates some of Moltmann's lesser works to his

Theolag}' of Hope.

8Ibid.
'Ibid.

1olli£..
William Hordern, "Introduction" New Directions in Theology Today
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1,0,), I,

,2-,3.

5
s ecclesiastical
And Chapter VI is the critique, in which the writer Use
tempor.ary church,
standards to evaluate Mo1tmann's contribution to the Con
attempts to identify the place of the theology of hope on the theolGgical
map by tracing selected coordinates and comine to a conclusion.

In the

conclusion, the writer sununarizes his answer to the question mentioned
above:

whether Theology of Hope offers a solution to the impasse.

In reading this dissertation it will be necessary to understand
certain terms used by both the writer and by Maltmann.

The term "historcism"

denotes the philosophy in which history is a closed system of cause and
effect.

The terms Historie and Geschichte 1 presented in this paper in

German either in the text or in parentheses, behind the English word
"history," were originally coined by Martin Kahler.

Kahler was reacting

against the attempt of the nineteenth-century theologians to present an
historical portrait cf Jesus without taking seriously the great salvation
which the biblical writers had found in Him. 12 Moltmann uses these tenns,
as did the existentialist theologians, the former term referring to
what can be established as having happened, the latter to the meaning
of what has happened.
Another difficult group of werds are taken from G. F.

w.

Hegel and

Karl Marx, dealing with the dialectical nature of the historical process.
The tenn "contradiction" (Widerspruch) denotes the ethical activity of
criticism, while "anithesis" (Differenze) denotes the entire dialectical
"side" in a given cycle of the historical process.
"thesis" (Wirklichkeit) represent the other "side."

12

Ibid. I, 58.

"Reality" or

'
The term eschatologia crucis is Moltmann's own, but the idea is
borrowed from Luther's theologia crucis.

Refusing to accept fully the

vertical dimension of Lutheranism, Moltmann tries to find a mare dynamic
expression.

His own eschatology, as will be pointed out below, is a

"cross with hope" eschatology, primarily concerned with corporate
fellowship rather than with individual blessedness.
Next come the terms dealing with promise and fulfillment.

The

term Wirklichkeit in the German original sometimes comes close to
meaning "fulfilment," but in a "theology of hope" sense; that is, an
incomplete, conditional fulfilment, that historical reality which we
know, or which some character from the past knew.

The promises include

..

Wirklichkeit, of course, but they include something else, the Uberschuss,
or "overspill" (Leitch), which stands against the historical reality
Drought about by the incomplete and conditional fulfilment of the promise

in a dialectical relationship, er.eating the antithesis to it.

As the

horizan of history moves forward, that "overspill" becomes important,
and the community committed ta the antithesis remembers it.

For the

contemporary interpreter,· past instances of thesis and anti thesis alike
have become &erlieferungen, or "traditions."
Finally, something has to be said about the term the present
writer has coined and employed in the thesis.

This is the tenn "anthro-

potheism•" One might also use the perjorative term "anthropolatry" as
a corresponding verbal noun.

Both words are synthetic creation of Greek

prefixes and suffixes used according to their standard English meanings.
The term "atheist" is definitely inaccurate to describe even Bloch, let
alone Moltmann.

Both Bloch and Mol tmann do have a "god."

The term

7
"hwnanist" is too imprecise, for it is used today to describe, for
example, both Bishop James A. Pike and Yevgeny Yevtushenko.
and Bloch believe in the future of humanity.

l-bltmann

The difference between

them is that in Moltmann's case that future is inseparable from the
future of Jesus Christ as he understands the latter.
Has Moltmann found an answer to the impasse of understanding?
Does he indeed take history more seriously than Bultmann did?

Does

his eschatology so color his hermeneutics as to lose the category of
history?

These are the questions one should ask in order to under-

stand what this study is all about.

The writer hopes that his work

on this dissertation has helped to provide access to some of the
questions raised by the issues.

•
CHAPTER II
M0LTMANN'S APPROACH TO AN IMPASSE OF UNDERSTANDING:
HISTORICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEOLCGY
Jurgen Moltmann wrote his Theology of Hope in the face of a long
dominant historicism, particulary of the positivist variety.

What is

of special interest to the present study is the way in which Moltmann
has come to grips with the so-called "principle of analogy," as advocated
by historicists.

A basic presupposition of historicists (such as Wilhelm Dilthey
and Ernst Troeltsch) is a "common core of similarity 11 1 underlying all
reality.

That is, in order to understand the details of history, the

historicist assumes methodologically a principle of analogy.

He

assumes thereby that all events in history take place within those
limits of similarity which positivists believe are common to all that
is·· real.

Existentialist theologians accepted this principle of

analogy and applied it to biblical history.

As a result, their various

reconstructions of biblical history generally shared a co1JUnon limit.
This limit has influenced the efforts of certain other theologians
who are not themselves committed to existentialist theology, such as
R.R. Niebuhr when he says:

1J~rgen Moltma.nn, Theolof, of Hope, translated by James Leitch
(New York: Harper & Row, 1~,7~ P• 176.

'
Whether it be the idea of Jesus Christ, or of faith, or of
the ~hristian ~onununity that is offered as the key to the.
mearung of Gods . self-revelation in history, the way in which
that s~lf-r~vealing !!!£ ~ .2!'.!l existence participate i n ~
~ historical .f2r!!! !n9_ substantiality remains obscure. 2
The words "historical form and substantiality" reveal an acceptance
on Niebuhr's part of the principle of analogy; he has assumed that all
history, including the history of God's self-revelation, has something
in common with present existence.
principle.

Niebuhr was not advocating this

He was using it, and it led him to a problem.

He wanted

to find a key to the scriptures, but nothing in his own experience
presented itself as such a hermeneutical tool

0

Moltmann's studies have led him to the same impasse.

The Bible

has much to say about hope, about the future, about conditions which
contradict present conditions.
interpret biblical eschatology?

What kind of analogy can one use to
Then there is the question of Jesus

Christ, his death and resurrection.

Holtmann does not believe that

historicism can ever do justice to this event, or rather these events,
because for all their relatedness, these events do contradict one
another, and at the present time, if viewed historically, must be
viewed separately.

The resurrection presents a special difficulty

because nothing exists today that is analogous to it.
principle of analogy can be employed to study it.

Therefore no

What methodology

can one use, then, to interpret the death and resurrection of Jesus
Christ?

2R. R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York:
Charles Scribners' Sons, 1,57), p. 72.

•
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The Principle of Analogy
The situation thus described, which Moltmann faced, involves an
understanding of historical inquiry as one which requires analogical
reasoning .3 This methodology, as was mentioned before, is grounded in
an "ontological" assumption of a conunon core of similarity underlying
all events.

This, for example, was the position of Ernst Troeltsch.4

Without this more basic, metaphysical assumption of similarity, the
analogical principle would be unintelligible.

Therefore all historical

understanding must remain within the realm of what is comprehensible
in terms of analogy.5
The biblical message, however, refuses to fit inta this
predetermined picture.
In face of this basing of historical understanding on a
metaphysical definition of the core, the substance or the
subject of history, Christian theology finds itself in
grave difficulties as it seeks to reflect upon the proclamation of the resurrection . In face of the pantheistic
definition of the nature of history, according to which
the eternal iQea does not delight to present itself wholly
in an individual, it becomes impossigle to regard a person
and an event in history as absolute.
This is indeed a problem for the Christian theologian, a problem
which would not present itself to him if he could either make little
of the resurrection accounts, which would be untrue to his theological task,

3Moltma.nn, p. 175 .
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
•Ibid. , p. 177.

11
or if he could bypass the common core similarity in just one case,
not necessarily one event, but one set of events.
In face of the positivistic and mechanistic definition of
the nature of history as a self-contained system of cause
and effect, the assertion of a raising of ,Jesus by God appears
as a IT(Yth concerning a supernatural incursion which is
contradicted by all our experience of the world. And finally,
in face of the philosophy of life with its definition of the
creative ground of life that manifests and objectifies itself
in history, the Easter texts can be taken only as the expres~ion
of the life acts of a faith which is in itself unfathomable.·(
The historian, unlike the natural scientist, is unable to experience
his subject matter.

&>

the theologian, confronted with the task of

interpreting the Bible, has more in common with the historian (who
like-wise cannot deal with empirical data) than with the natural
scientist (who insists on dealing with nothing else).

The historian

uses the principle of analogy to cope with this inability, taking an
event which he has experienced or can probably experience as the analogue
to the event which he must study.

Moltmann, as a theologian who is

deeply concerned with history, finds that he has to use the principle
of analogy as historians do, but only as a methodological tool.

He

can pick this tool up and put it down again when he finds that it
does not accomplish the task.

Moltmann does not tie the principle of

analogy to an ontological presupposition of a common core of similarity
as Troeltsch once did.

This frees Moltmann to explore new possibilities

in hermeneutics which would not be permitted under historicism. 8

7rbid.
8 Ibid., p. 176.

-

12

The existential theologians developed their hermeneutical programs
dogmatically, beginning with historicism, then searching around the
field of contemporary experience for the analogue.
a good example.

Rudolf Bultmann is

His program was arranged around what Carl Braaten calls

his "non-theological point of contact,"' a cultural jumping-off place
from which to draw the analogy between the present, in which the
interpreter must work, and the past, in which the documents arose.

For

Bultmann this point of contact was the existential philosophy of Martin
Heidegger.

Bultmann saw Heidegger's alternatives of authentic and

inauthentic existence as analogous to St. Paul's dichotomy between the
spirit and the flesh.

He identified the ancient analogue with the

modern, and that identity became the starting point for his theology. 10
Other existential theologians have not gone so far as Bultmann.

Heinrich

Ott, for example, does not identify his past and present analogues, but
strives for meaningful "dialogue II between Heidegger I s philosophy and
Barthain and Bultmannian theology.11
R.R. Niebuhr's limitations under the principle of analogy have
been referred to above.

He is not an existentialist, like Bultmann

and Ott, therefore his non-theological point of contact does not come

from Heidegger.

He developed one trial point of contact in his essay

Archegos. 12 The analogue for Niebuhr is personhood, and the philosopher

'John B. Cobb, "A New Trio Arises in Europe," New Theology, edited
by Martin Marty and Dean Peerman (New York: Macmillan, 1,,5), II, 260-2,1 •
10Ibid.
11 Ibid.
•i.R. R. Niebuhr, 11 Archegos, 11 Christian Histo
and Inter retation,
edited by W.R. Farmer, et al. (Cambridge: University Press, 1,67.

1J

of history Wilhelm Dilthey is his cultural source for his point of
contact.

The link that connects the reader with Israel or the early

Christian community is the "moral experience of coming to life as
persons. 11 13 Dilthey called this "the rediscovery of the I in the thou." 14
This means that the present-day man can identify with the corporate
personality of Israel or the early church and so find the analogue
which opens the Scriptures for him.

In the miraculous beginnings of

Israel's history man finds the analogue to his birth.

In their many

compromises with pressures from the outside he finds something very
similar to the experience of personal guilt.

In the impotence of

Israel in the face of arising danger he finds the analogue to his failures, and to his sense of being helpless in the presence of a power
which he cannot use.
lfoltmann, however, confronts the existentialists and Niebuhr with
the question: So what?

So what if we can find a similarity between

events in the Bible and events today?
the history of Israel?

Does that completely comprehend

Is that all that history is, the constant re-

currence of events that we can experience here and now?
the resurrection of Jesus Christ?
present reality?

What about

To what does that correspond in

Since the common core of similarity itself, the

ground of historicism's principle ef analogy, is itself grounded not
in empirical evidence but in the positivist's interpretation of that

13 Ibid., p. ,4.
14Ibid., p. 80.

•
14

evidence, Moltmann can dispense with the core, and find new ways to
use the principle of analogy, free from the limitations of historicism.
Moltmann's first suggested departure is an application of the
principle of analogy that leaves room for the contingent and the new.15
Instead of presupposing that all events are similar, one might presuppose that ne two events are similar, or that some events are similar
but not ethers.

For the dissimilar events, Moltmann prefers to use

the word "new", because his own point of contact, which will be discussed later, is both dialectical and dynamic.

The word "new" lends

itself to describe contingent events much better than the static and
passive "dissimilar." Should the historian assume that no twe events
are similar, the consequence would be constant equivocation in every
statement he might make about his subject matter.

A more responsible

assumptien is that some events are similar and others are unique, what
M:>ltmann call a "supplementary interest in the new." 1, While Moltmann can
find no fault with such an approach on cenceptual grounds, he does not
find it adequate in itself to explain the history to which the New
Testament bears witness.

"This would merely represent a variant in

the historical picture which would still be possible and conceivable
without a theology of the resurrection. 11 17 The Scriptures do not present
the resurrection as an isolated, accidental event that just happened to
be dissimilar from other events.

1 5Moltmann, p. 11,.
1'Ibid.
17Ibid.

,

15
For the ra.i.sing of Christ involves not the category of the
accidentally new, but the expectational category of the
eschatologically new. The eschatologically new event of
the resurrection of Christ, however, proves to be a n0vum
ultimum both as against the similarity in ever-recurring
reality and also as against the comparative dissimilarity
of new possibilities emerging· in history.18
Medieval theologians used the term novissima to refer to the events
of the end of time, to the hora novissima.

Moltmann is willing to use

the term the same way, not in an Aristotelian sense, as it occurs in
Bernard of Morlaix's poem, nor in the accidental sense as the word "new"
is commonly used in English, but in an eschatological sense that takes
all history seriously.
By the raising of Christ we do not mean a possible process
in world history, but the ;schatological process to which
all history is subjected. 1
This is because the resurrection, while it was an event in history,
was not part of the system of history as understood by historicism.
Rather, it assailed that system from the outside.

The term "eschato-

logically new," based as it is on the medieval concept, denotes the
radicality of the event and the force by which the event shapes the
future, subjecting the processes of history to its own criticism. 26
So Noltmann takes his own approach to the principle of analogy,
using eschatology as his starting paint.

18Ibid.

1'rbid., p. 11,-1ao.
28Ibid.

This is his "analogy for

•
16

the future. 11 Moltmann had said that theology also had the option of
constructing its own CQncept of history on a basis of an eschatological
understanding of the resurrection, freeing theology from any existing
concept of history.

In this case the theologian could attempt to

arrive at a new understanding of history with ultimate possibilities
and

hopes derived from the presupposition ef the raising of Christ

from the dead. 21
What are the consequences of this ld.nd of analogical theory for
hermeneutical practice?

It directs Christian hermeneutics toward

present mission and future hope.
Then the resurrectien ef Christ does not offer itself as an
analogy to what can be experienced any time and anywhere, but
as an analogy of what is to come to all •.••• It must
therefore contradict all rigid substantiometaphysical
definitions ef the common core of similarity in world
... events, and therefore also the corresponding historical
understanding that works with analogy. It must develop a
historical understanding which works with eschatological
analegy • • • •22
This analogy for the future will be referred to again when the
discussion turns to solutions offered in Theology of Hope.

Here the

author's only concern is to try to point out some of the cogitations
that Moltmann implies he experienced in wrestling with the impasse
presented to him by analogical historical reason.

In the preceding

discussion one problem was central to all of M:>ltmann's attack on
existential theology and historicism.
discussed.

21

Ib1.· d., p. 18"
"'•

That problem must now be

I
17
The Historical Question of the Resurrection
It was noted above that according to the canons of "the positivistic
and mechanistic definition of the nature of history" with which the
existentialists worked "the assertion of a raising of Jesus by God
appears as a myth. 11 23 M:>ltmann was observing the conclusions drawn by
Bultmann, as may be described by the following quotes:
But what of the resurrection? Is it not a mythical event
pure and simple? Obviously it is not an event of past
history with a self-evident meaning.24
An historical fact which involves a resurrection from the
dead is utterly inconceivable.25
By "~h" Bultmann meant an event conceivable to a particular way of

looking at the world, the mythological, which was prevalent in the first
century but is now generally considered t~ be untenable.
sion lead Bultmann to a program of demythologizing.

This conclu-

Hermeneutics

involved presenting a gospel that did not depend on a direct relationship to an "utterly inconceivable" event.

Holtmann makes a great deal

more of this step in procedure than Bultmann, who passes over this
important conclusion with a simple adverb, implying that the need for
demythologizing is oavious to all.
The first question regarding the reality of the resurrection of
Christ will always be concerned with the fact which is reported

23Ibid., p. 177.
24Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and },\ythology," Kery~ and Myth,
edited by Hans Werner Bartsch (New ~ork: Harper & Row, 1,,i; p. J8.
2 5Ibid., p.

J,.

a
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and proclaimed by the Easter witnesses. Since this fact is
reported as an event, the question as to the reality of this
event will in the first instance take the form of a historical
question.2 6
So

Moltmann is asking a factual questien : ls the event which is

repttrted and proclaimed a "real" event?

In this centext one might

well substitute the word "historical" for the word "real, 11 since
M:>ltmann says he is concerned with facticity, and is willing to submit to the results of historical inquiryo
There would be no problem here except for the subjugation of all
historical inquiry to positivistic historicism.

It was the assumption

that historicism contained the only intellectually cogent methods of
inquiry that led Bultmann to conclude that the resurrection of Jesus
Christ was inconceivable.

Meltmann agrees that if one only works with

historicism, then history is man's history alone; man is the "real"
subject of history in the sense of its metaphysical hypckeimenGn, and
divine activity, such as the raising of Jesus Christ from the dead is
historically meaningless.27
For the existentialists on the other hand, meaning is divorced
from fact, faith is separated from history, the world is divided into
two parts.

One is o'bjectivity, dealing •,.i:i.th what can be experienced

or deonstrated; the other is subjectivity, which is private, individual,
inward, concerned with interpretation rather than perceptiGn, with

2 'Moltmann, p. 172.
27~., p. 174 ..

-,

reflection rather than experience.

History, accordingly, is split

into two levels which are recognized by their German names:

Historie,

the pursuit of facts and the findings of that pursuit, and Geschichte,
the pursuit of meaning, the interpretation, and the final tale as it
is told by the writing historian as the end product of both processes.
Christian faith is assigned to the subjective realm, and accordingly,
the resurrection, as a product of faith, is expelled from Hi.storie
(except in a demythologized £orm) and is assigned to the interpreters
•f Geschichte.
The dichotomy between subject and object is a direct result of
the positivist view of the wcrld.

As a result, it has been criticized

by theologians who want to take history seriously.

For example, Eric

G. Rust in his book Toward a Theological Understanding of Hi.sto¢8
has apparently shared some of Moltmann's concerns about Bultmann's
existentialist dichotomy:
1'he danger of the movement of Bultmann and his followers is
that they should divorce the meaning from the historical
actuality, separate Geschichte from Hi.storie, until, for
some extremeists, it would not appear to matter whether
the resurrection was an actual event in world history so
long as the church could affirm its faith in a risen Lord.
The recognition that history has an inner and an outer side
is one thing. The attempt to emphasize the fonner at the
expense of the latter will mean in the end that the former
also ceases to be historical revelation. It becomes dissolved
into a modern form of n~o-Platonic mysticism, and history
does not really matter.~,

28Eric G·. Rust, Toward a Theolo ical Understandin
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1,,3 •
2'Ibid., p.

,?.

of Histo

Moltmann like Rust, also warns against this inevitable result of
making a sharp division between the subjective and the objective:
If according to this now universally binding and universally
recognized view of reality, scientifically and historically
speaking, the gods are silent~-or hearing them is 0ptional and
lef't to the individual's discretion - then a theology of
the resurrection can be developed only at a point which is
not affected by this view of reality and comes under the aegis
of the individual's subjectivity--which, however, means only
in that realm of human subjectivity and inwardness which is
set free by ~he rationalizing of the world and the historicizing
of history.3
God, and all kinds of statements about God, are not the subject
matter of t ·he historicist's history, of Historie, as Bultmann and
Rust have used the term.

Moltma.nn also uses the term this way at

the beginning of his book, where he discusses his problem with historicism.

Later on, when he proposes his own program for hermeneutics,

he uses Historie in another sense, making use of the principles of
Wolfhart Pannenberg, which will be discussed in Chapter III below.
The impasse imposed on Moltmann by the historicists may best
be summarized by saying that positivistic historicism cannot be used
as a way of explaining the resurrection event.

(Nor, as will soon be

shown, could Moltmann simply turn his back on it.)

Those theologians

who could see no other form of historical explanation than that contained in historicism had to by-pass history altogether as a
hermeneutical category.

Holtmann describes his impasse thus:

If the reality of the resurrection cannot be comprehended
by the historical means of the modern age, neither is the
modern intellectual way of dealing with history comprehensible
for faith.

3~Moltmann, P• 181.
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The fides guarens intellectum must then give up all claim to
an intellectus fidei in the realm of history. This is
primarily done by the existentialists by theology's leaving
aside the historical question as to the reality of the
resurrection • • • It then leaves the knowledge of history
to all kinds of pantheistic or atheistic principles, and
concentrates on the personal encounter, the non-objectifiable
experience or the existential decision, to which the Easter
kerygma leads) 1
What is a theologian to do?

Could~ possibly aspire to attain

a theological view of history, "a revolution in the historical way of
thinking"?3 2 R.R. Niebuhr's claim that theology's problem with historical reason lies in the fact that the theologian has fallen victim to
a "heterogenous historical method" and therefore "is bound to become
increasingly skeptical about the actual historical data of the New
Testament"33 is another good summary statement of this side of Moltmann's
dilemma.

Both theologians have noticed the impasse, both are aware

that the dichotomy between subject and object is itself non-objectifiable,
and the two serve as interlocutors in the developing dialogue in which
new possibilities for hermeneutics are "brainstormed." Historicism as
a discipline for explaining historical events is heterogeneous to
theology, and one might add heteronomic as well.

Nevertheless, theo-

logical thinking has dealth with no other history than the historicist's.
Niebuhr's contribution toward solving this enigma has been the
suggestion of two alternatives to historicism:

3 1Ibid., pp. 177-178.
32
Ibid., PP• 181-182.
33Niebuhr, Resurrection, pp.

1,-ss.
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There are two possible methods for attacking the tension
between the modern idea of historical causality and the
resurrection event. One is to develop a strictly scientific
theology with its own unique method which does not borrow
critical or positive principles from other disciplines.
The other is to reexamine the nature of historical causality
and re-define it, if necessary. The latter course would
involve a careful inquiry into the nature of historical
thought a~g its relationship to the program of Christian
theology.
The first alternative proposes theological science as a new
method of hi.storical explanation, in which theology would develop its
own canons for interpreting historical events.

The advantage would be

that theology could no longer complain about a heterogeneous method of
studying hi.story.

Moltmann does not approve of it however, for it

represents the other side of the impasse.

He cites Mi.ldenberger's

criticism of Niebuhr's first suggestion and agrees that it is subject
to that criticism.

Mildenberger said that although Niebuhr's scientific

theology would enable the theologian so speak "Christianly" about histery, it would also subject actuality (Wirklichkeit) to the human community (menschliche Gemeinschaft) as the reality against which one
comprehends all events.35 This human community, then, would take the
place of another human community, the scientific and technical
community, as the standard by which reality is measured.

Now

Mildenberger does not say that the scientific and technical community
has any ontological ground for its assertions, as Troeltsch's common
core of similarity, but he does argue that most people would not be

34~., P• 33.
35F. Mildenberger, 11 Auferstanden am dritten Tage nach den Schriften,"
Evangelische Theologie XX.III (1,•3), 274-715.
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able to comprehend the church's proclamation, the apologetic task would
suffer, and the church would be drawn into an ideological "ghetto. 11 36
t-bltmann agrees that the church's hermeneutical task would be ill-served
if it did not make the faith and its sources intelligible to those outside the church.37 This, then, is the other side of the impasse.
Moltmann is forced to discard the alternative of a theological view of
history that by-passes, rather than confronts, positivism.
Niebuhr's second alternative was to seek within the discipline
of history itself a new defi~tion of history which would be more amenable
te theology.

If that were possible it would not be subject to Milden-

berger1s criticism, because theology would still be using a discipline
that was comprehensible to the community outside the church.

Niebuhr

faults historicists for treating historical events as though they were
natural phenomena, and thereby mald.ng the canons of natural science the
principles of historiography, forgetting that a •:non-natural dimension
of history" also exists.JS As Schleiermacher erred because he used rules
of natural law instead of the canons of historical sequence at the
critical point of contact between Jesus and the early church, Niebuhr
believes that by reversing the process the resurrection can become meaningful to the historical reason of the Christian theologian.J,

J'Ibid.
371-k>ltmann, pp. 181-182.
3 8Niebuhr, Resurrection, pp. 77-7f
J,Ibid.
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Moltmann has found such an alternative to historicism within the
theological and the historiographic communities which he believes will
properly deal with the resurrection event.

This is the optimistic,

future-oriented analogy principle resulting from an eschatological
understanding of the reality of the resurrection, maldng use of the
principles of Wolfhart Pannenberg, and a subsequent eschatological
view of history, which will be discussed in Chapters

III and IV below.

By beginning with the New Testament itself Moltmann comes to this

conclusion:
The historian who enquires into the reality of the resurrection
of Jesus is confronted in the biblical texts not only by realities
Qf history, but also with a different outloC:>k on the experience
and significance of history, which sets the event here recounted in a different light. The experience of history which
is expressed in the historical approach is here confronted not
merely by events which are more or less wel1 testified, more or
less imaginatively embellished, but this experience of history
is also confronted by a different experience of history. Hence
the historical question as to the reality of the resurrection
recoils upon the historical enquirer and cal.ls in question the
basic experience of history which is the ground of his historical
enquiry. The historical question as to the historicity of the
resurrection of Christ is thereby expanded to include the
questionability of the historical approach to history as such.46
So

right in the New Testament, at theology's fountain and source,

Mol.tma.nn finds the key that unlocks the hermeneut.ical door, but not in
a way that makes apologetics impossible, for he is dealing with a cultural, though non-positivistic, principle of historical analogy.

Not

only has Moltma.nn made a negative remark about the historical explan-

ation of the resurrection, he has in fact made a negative remark about

40.Moltma.nn, PP• 174-175.
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all that the modern world has commonly called historical explanation.
He says it is questionable.
to set history aside.
icism aside.

But this does not mean that he is ready

He is only willing to set positivistic histor-

Moltmann still refuses to accept the subjection of gen-

erally recognized standards of inquiry to the faith of the church, and
he finds Niebuhr's methods inadequate to explain the event of Jesus'
resurrection (the first because it was subject to Mildenberger 1 s
criticism; the second because he preferred the eschatologi.cal point of
contact to the "non-natural" yet historical).

So

he begins where

Albert Schweitzer departed, with the eschatological understanding of
history as a method more homogeneous with Christian theology, still
capable of being comprehended by the community outside the church,
filled with the category of the new and the different, the categories
Qf promise, expectation, and hope.
The Eschatological Problem
In addition te historical analogy and the peculiar problems arising
i'rom the historical question of the resurrection, Moltmann presents his
new approach to the impasse most clearly in the area of the eschatological
theme in the Bible.

Albert Schweitzer had pointed out that this theme

was central to the message of Jesus and of the entire New Testament.
The basic content of the theme was the expectation of the return of
Jesus as the Son of Man at which time the kingdom of God would begin
as a universal condition rather than a community's hope.

Schweitzer

held that the failure of the parousia during the apostolic generation
meant that the eschatolegy of the New Testament had been invalidated.
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This judgment was accepted by the exponents of "liberal" theology and
the "religious-historical school" (Religionsgeschichtlicheschule) .41
The effect upon hermeneutics was the removal of eschatological considerations from serious theology and the quest for a cultural point of
contact.

In other words, historicism had laid claims to the future as

well as the past.

If theology was going to accept the principle of

historicism as scientifically validated it would have to remove the
religious element, the "God talk," from the sphere of history past,
present, and future.42
Carl Braaten claims that eschatology is incredible to modern man.43
Nevertheless, it is central to Jesus and the New Testament.

Theologians

are responsible for the hermeneutical task of explaining how that
eschatology is relevant to our time.
Few theologians have agreed with Schweitzer. Somewhat piously
they have assumed that what is so central to the New Testament
must still somehow be relevant to our time. It is as if they
had their hands on a cord attached to a powerful electric
generator, but haven't found where to plug it in. That iZ-4
what we mean by the need for a cultural point of contact.
11

Pannenberg, Johannes Metz, and others" have made many similar

statements.

They realize that the classical dogmatic treatment of

eschatology has been to append that doctrine to their systems under
the heading of "The last Things" (Johann Gerhard), or it has been

41 Leonhard Goppelt, "The Easter Kerygma in the New Testament,"
The Easter Message for Today, translated by Salvator Attanasio and
Darrell Guder (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1964), p. JO.
4 2Ibid.
43 Carl E. Braaten, "Toward a Theology of Hope" New Theology /15
edited by ~artin Marty and Dean Peerman (New York: Macmillan, 1968),
p.

95.
44rb·,
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dechronologized so that every critical situation is viewed an eschatological (Kierkegaard, C.H. Dode, and the Bultmann school).

Speaking

to this problem, Johannes Metz urges theologians not to reduce eschatology to a part of their theology but to understand it radically as "the
determining factor in all theological statements. 11 45 For Metz the "cultural point of contact" was, at least experimentally, the process
philosophy of the universe.

Eschatology, then, is theology's statement

about the process which is so central to all of life.

"It is only in

the eschatological horizon that the world appears as a becoming reality
whose development is entrusted to the freedom of man."4'
Moltmann sees the connection between the kind of eschatology
that these theologians are calling for and the promise and hope scheme
which is central to the history of Israel.

He also sees the connection

between the static view of the world presented by historicism and
/

existentialism and the static idea of the Greek Kc<f'P.O S

as the

epiphany of the eteznal present, the appearance of truth.47 As a result,
Moltmann finds that he cannot work with any static concept of eschatology
or of the world, but, beginning with the New Testament history itself,
in order to start the henneneutical task over again, he can approach
his material directly, using eschatology itself as a key to the Scriptures.

45 Johannes Metz "Creative Hope" New Theology edited by Martin
Marty and Dean Pee~n (New York, Macmillan, 1,,a), V, 135.
4,Ibid.
47Moltmann, pp. 40- 41.
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If Pannenberg and Moltmann are right we will again have to
endure the tedium of another effort to activate the meaning
of eschatology, and try to understand it, because without
biblical eschatology nothing r~ains that deserves to be
called "the biblical message."
The impasse which Moltma.nn reached may be summarized as follows:
on the one hand, the principle of analogy used by the historicists was
too limited to deal with biblical interpretation; on the other hand, for
theology to be understood outside of the church, it was necessary to
use that principle.

Moltmann's approach was to separate the methedology

of historicism from its metaphysical assumptions and to apply the principle of analogy under new presuppositions.

Moltmann calls these pre-

suppositions the "eschatological understanding of history." The
methodology he calls "analogy for the future." They may be described,
respectively, as dynamic historicism and a dialectical-critical method,
or antithesis criticism.

Both Moltmann's understanding of history

and his methodology will be studied in detail in the next two chapters.

48Braaten, XXIII, ,5.

CHAPTER III
SOLUTIONS OFFERED IN THEOLCGY OF HOPE
History of Traditions
The previous chapter dealt with Jurgen Moltmann's problem, that
hermeneutics had been captured by historicism.

Now our discussion

must turn away from the problem M:>ltmann faced, and to which he intended
to minister in Theology of Hope, to the solutions he offers in that
work.

In this chapter the emphasis is on Moltmann's methodological

tools for solving the problem, especially his use of the discipline of

..

Uberlieferungsgeschichte, which has been translated both as "history
of traditions" and "history of the transmission of tradition, 11 the
latter with a view toward the process of the evolution of traditional
themes.

In this study the words of the first translation are employed

with a view to brevity, but they should be taken as conveying the con~
tent of the second translation.

In the next chapter the emphasis will

shift from methodology to Moltma.nn's philosophical basis for hermeneutics, especially his radical eschatology.
The question of continuity in the New Testament as a prototype of the
hermeneutical gap
The biblical interpreter is confronted by continuity gaps
throughout the practice of his discipline.

There are the gaps between

JO
the Old and New Testaments, between the "historical Jesus" and the
"resurrected Lord," between the disciples that travelled with Jesus and
the apostles who founded the church, and between the Hel lenistic church
and the thought world of the interpreter himself.

Of all these questions,

Moltma.nn makes most of the gap between Jesus before His death and the
L0rd of the church.

Although he treats all the gaps in Theology of Hope,

this one forms the microcosm for the others in which ~bltmann the problemsolver becomes manifest.

For example, Moltmann recognizes that the

faith of the church must somehow be related to the life and thought of
Jesus of Nazareth; that Jesus cannot be a mere x to the historian.

It

is no wonder today that we find an article entitled "Did Jesus believe
in God? 111
The problem here described is one of continuity.

Moltmann, like

R. F. Aldwinckle, poses a critique for the school of Bultmann.

Rudolf

Bultmann apparently saw no problem in by-passing any historical discontinuity
between Jesus and the church, but the existentialist theologians ~ave
made several attempts to answer Aldwinckle's question.

Gunther Bornkamm,

for example, sought a new revelation given to the post-Easter disciples;
Gerhard Ebeli~g and Ernest Fucps tried to find evidence for the incipient
kerygma in the teachings of Jesus.2 They found the key to continuity in
their concept of "faith as a word-event. 113 They believe that what uniq~ely
came to expression in Jesus was faith.

1he faith of Jesus, when imitated

1

R. F. Aldwinckle, "Did Jesus Believe in God ?" New Theology
edited by, Martin .l'larty and Dean Peerman (New York: Macmillan, 1,68), V. 76 .
2Leonhard Goppelt, "The Easter Kerygma in the New Testament,"
The Easter Message for Today, translated by Salvator Attanasio and
Darrell Guder (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1964), pp. J2-JJ.
Jcarl Braaten, History and Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1,66), p. 71.
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in the faith of the disciples, epened the latter to the future as Jesus
was o~en t0 it, and it caused them to share God's love as Jesus had
shared it.4 They explained faith thus: man receives the Word, a language
event in which the speaker communicates himself in love.

The faith

which is awakened is the only evidence necessary to establish the language event as the Word of God.5 But such approaches fall short of the
sort of evidence far which Moltmann is searching.

Word and faith come

inte being and leave it again all in the realm of subjectivity .

For

Bultmann and his disciples it must be so, as was noted in Chapter II,
because subjectivity is the only field of human knowledge that is not
under the thrall of historicism.

Ebeling and Fuchs use the principle

of analogy this way and come to this conclusion.

Hence any continuity

established only on the faith of Jesus is not historical, and therefore
it is too small for Moltmann.
The key to the historical problem, as demonstrated above, is the
resurrection.

Evidence for the resurrection consists of the reports of

the empty tomb, the Easter appearances of Jesus, and the sending of the
Holy Spirit.

The appearance were, notably, only to these wha were Jesus'

disciples, just as the meanings of the parables were revealed only to
the disciples.

A message was connected with each appearance.

And

finally, the resurrection occurred "according to the Scriptures,"
that is, it fit in with the hopes and expectations of the Jews.

4Ibid.
5Jghn B. Cobb, "A New Trio Arises in Europe", New Theolog,v
edited by Martin Marty and Dean Peerman (New York: Macmillan, 1,,5),
V, 25,.
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l-bltmann is not the first to seek the continuity in the event of
the resurrection itself as seen in its ap0calyptic context.

Ernst

Kasemann has tried. to "rehabilitate" the apocalyptic themes which
Albert Schweitzer had shown to be the cruz of Jesus' message, and which
Schweitzer later eschewed as incampatible with present thought. 6 Speaking to this impasse brought about by Schweitzer's analysis, Leonhard
Goppelt had made an especially clear statement:
This lonely resurrection would be a meaningless miracle had
it been experienced by any other man, a rabbi or a proppet.
For the disciples, however, it is substantiated on the basis
of an understanding of faith. They knew Jesus from their
discipleship of the earthly days as Him through whom God
effected His eschatological redemption. Even more they
knew Him as the one Who in His Person is the Promised One. 7
By pointing to the category of promise, Goppelt has brought the

entire Old Testament into focus on the resurrection event.

\o./hereas

Existentialist exegets had divorced apocalyptic themes from the Old

..

Testament, finding yet another breach of continuity, Oberlieferu"e:sgeschichte joins the ends of the gap by concentrating (at least
at one period of its development in the early works of Wolfhart
Pannenberg, R. Rendtorff, et al.) on the promise-fulfillment scheme of
the Old Testament. 8 Pannenberg makes the further claim that

9Braaten, p. 171
7aoppelt, p. 51

8 Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Redemptive :b.vent and History," Essays on
~ Testament Hermeneutics, translated by Shirley Guthrie, edited by
Claus Westermann (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1,60), pp. 321-322.
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The eschatology of the New Testament is no more a radical
break with the historical consciousness of Israel than that
of the Apocalyptist. Jesus made the hope of salvation depend
on a relationship to His Person rather than the Torah, and
this is the radical break with the Old Testament. As far
as the understanding of reality is concerned, the N;w
Testament is in fundamental agreement with the Old.
So the study of apocalyptic traditions fonns the basis of the

continuity between Jesus and the early church and between the testaments.
Moltmann makes use of Pannenberg 's material here and throughout his
Theology of Hope, so much so that one or two quotes would never do
justice to the picture Moltmann presents.

But there is one unique

contribution to the continuity question which Moltmann offers.
is the "eschatology of the crass."

This

This, z.ioltma.nn claims, is what is

uniquely Christian about New Testament eschatology, and also uniquely
historical.

He examines the contradiction between the cross of Jesus

and the resurrection, and finds continuity in the contradiction itself.
Between the expectations of late Jewish apocalyptic and
Christian eschatolegy stands the cross of Jesus. Hence
all Christian resurrection eschatology bears the mark of
an eschatologia crucis. That is more than merely a break
in the coherent historic tradition of apocalyptic expectations. The contradiction of the cross permeates also the
whole existence, liflb and theological thinking of the
Church in the world. ·
The contradiction which began with the cross and resurrection did
not disappear with the Easter appearances of Jesus.

That same contra-

diction lies deep within the life of the Church, in the first century,

'Ibid.
18Jurgen Moltmann, Theolo'j: of Hope, tra nslated by James Leitch,
(New York: Harper & Row, 1,,5~ p. SJ.
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and ever since.

Moltmann explains that

The trend towards the Catholicism in the life and thought of
the ancient Church is plain. The ecstacy of eschatological
ful.fi.llment in the Christ event is the presupposition for this
process of the transformation of Christianity into an ecstatic
form of Hellenistic mystery religien and into an ecumenical
world Church. This form of "presentative eschatology" • • •
can be called an eschatologia gloriae, if it is still possible
to comprehend it in eschatological categories at all. 11
In the above paragraph Moltmann has used some exegetical jargon.
By "Catholicism" he means the theology of the Pastoral epistles, of
James, Second Peter, and certain select passages in the Fourth Gospel
which Bultmann claimed were later additions to that Gospel.

This

Early Catholicism consisted of a Christianity that had been cultified
as a result of Hellenization.

For example, the category of Messiah

had receded in favor of "the Lord," with kyrios not signifying adonai
or

fl 1fl"

empire.

as it does in Paul, but signifying the prince of a spiritual

The devotion once given only to the quasi-deified Caesar had

been transferred to a Hellenized version of the Great Eschatological
Prophet.

As Bultmann described "Early Catholicism," worship consisted

in celebration 0f the epiphany of Christ, "which title now signified a
hypestasis of God in which the believer could participate through
Baptism." Moltmarin finds in the epistles of Paul an attempt to combat
the "presentative eschatology" of the "Early Catholics, 11 an effort in
which Paul was not ultimately successful.

Holtmann says,
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But now, the polemic in which Paul attacks Hellenism is
marked both by a new recognition of the significance of
the cross of Christ and also by a new recognition of a
truly futuristic eschatology, and thus becomes a criticism 8f presentative eschatology as such • • • • This
does not refer to mere repetition or tiresome relics of
late Jewish apocalyptic in Paul, but means his own
apocalyptic, which is kindled by an eschatology of the
cross and is therefore hostile to every eschatological
ecstacy of fulfillment.12
So Moltmann bases his approach to the problem of continuity between

Jesus of Nazareth and the early Church en this very contradiction:
the eschatology of the cross, the unity of the crucified with the
resurrected, and the suffering-hoping community which is faithful
to the crucified and risen Lord.
Against the uniting of the believer with the dying and
rising Lord of the cultus a~er the fashion of the
mysteries Paul asserts an eschatological distinction:
baptism is the means of participating in the Christ
event of the crucifixion and death of Christ. Fellowship with Christ is fellowship in suffering with the
crucified Christ. The baptized are dead with Christ,
it they are not already risen with him and translated
into heaven in the perfect tense of the cultus. They
attain participation in the resurrected by new obedience,
which unfolds ~tself in the realm of the hope of the
resurrection. 1
So Moltmann's Pauline eschatology of the cross is, to
Moltmann's essay of thinking, futuristic, bringing hope to an otherwise cheerless present.

This hope leads the believer into "the

tensions and antitheses of obedience and suffering in the world."14

12

Ibid., pp. 1,0-1,1.

13Ibid., p. 1,1.
14Ibid.

Antithesis is a key concept in Moltmann's hermeneutical approach to the
New Testament.

He does not view contradiction as a disruption of con-

tinuity, but as a dialectical pole that forms part of an historical
pattern.

Moltmann finds continuity between Christ's own contradiction

of his present and the believer's contradiction of his.

The resurrec-

tion serves as God's vindication ef Christ's contradiction, just as the
future will serve as God's vindication of the believer I s.

Around this

view of the power of the future Moltmann has constructed a theology,
usi~ philosophical categories b~rrowed from an extremely dynamic
form of dialectical materialism as represented by the work of Ernst
Bloch.
¥JG>ltmann I s resultant "eschatological understanding of history"
will De discussed in further detail in the second section of Chapter

IV below.

The chief concern here is to shew how Moltmann uses the con-

cept of contra~ction in his exegetical methodolegy.

In this case, by

the concept of the eschatolcgy of the cross, he brings together the
Risen Lord and the crucified Jesus.

Moltmann even thinks of his escha-

tology as a means to take history seriously, for he says,
only an eschatology of promise can overcome (the epiphany
religion) mythical and illusionary view of the world and
of human existence, because it alone takes the trials, the
contradictions, and the godlessness of the world seriously
in a meaningful way, because it makes faith and obedience
possible in the world not by regarding the contradictions
as of n• account, buy 8Y enabling us to believe and obey
on the ground of ou, hope in the overcoming of these contradictions by God. 5

15~., p. 1(..3.
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Having bridged the ancient gap between Jesus and the Risen Lord,
Moltmann also uses the concept of dialectical continuity to bridge
the modern hermeneutical gap between the thoughts world of the New
Testament and the Church to whom the modern preacher must minister.
The Lord is the same.

The contradictions between His death and His

resurrection are "an inherent part of his identity. 1116 The church
today is identified with the mission of Jesus, and the mission of the
apostles.

History today is determined by the future of Jesus Christ.

In the resurrection this future was revealed, and now it stands before
the Church on its mission as an object of hope. 17
The history of traditions, data, and analogy
The history of traditions, or the history of the transmission
of traditions (Uberlieferungsgeschichte) is the hermeneutical discipline whereby traditional sources of theology are interpreted according
to the principles of modern historical research with a special intent
to investigate the continuity and development of salvation-historical
themes throughout the various. periods of universal history.

This dis-

cipline is based on the presupposition that all fields of human knowledge are related.

1'Ibid. , p. 201.
l?Ibid., p. 212.

Regardless of the findings of "higher criticism, 11
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the traditions themselves are historical facts.
realm of empirical data.

They belong to the

..

Moltmann uses the discipline of Uberliefer-

ungsgeschichte as a methodological t&ol, applying Wolfhart Pannenberg 1 s
principle that "what is learned from science and philosophy, as well as
world history, must be integrated with what is learned from Scripture

and the Christ event. 11 18 The problem with the principle of analogy
which was discussed in Chapter II above arose largely because the sphere
of theology had been isolated from other spheres of inquiry.

By

accepting Pannenberg 1 s principle of mutual relevance between sacred and
secular knowledge, Moltmann is, methodologically, able to rise above
those "walls erected from the time of Kant to protect the sphere of
theology from other spheres of inquiry," 1' and apply the infonnation
gained from this hermeneutical vantage point to interpret the Scriptures.
It has been said that Moltmann is dependent on Pannenberg in the same
way that Bultmann was dependent on Heidegger.
There is some truth to the contention that Pannenberg is "busy
constructing the philosophical underpinnings for the theology of hope, 11 20
but one must remember that Pannenberg is himself a theologian rather than
a philosopher.

He is also involved in biblical interpretation, hence

"philesophical underpinnings" does not mean that "philosophical under-

18
Cobb, p. 263.
1'Ibid.
20Richard J. Neuhaus,

Wolfhart Pannenberg: Profile of a Theologian,"
Theology and the Kingdom of God, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 19&9),
p. 1~.

11

pinnings" does not mean the same thing as what Braaten called a
"cultural point of contact." In other words, the relationship between
Pannenberg and f.x>ltma.nn is not the same as that between Heidegger and
Bultmann, between a cultural philosopher and a theologian-disciple
who makes the philosophy the basis for his hermeneutical analogy.
Moltmann is not a disciple of Pannenberg, but a brother theologian
who is willing to acknowledge his colleague's principles as valuable,
and to use them as a point of departure for solutions to his own
hermeneutical and eschatological questions.
So far, Moltmann's solutions have been sought mostly in negating

methodological procedures of the historicists: the distance between
"subject" and "object," the separation between language and event,
Historie and Geschichte, or fact and meaning.

W
ben one investigates

Yioltmann's use of Pannenberg's principles, however, he does find a positive statement about the former's own hermeneutics, which are being
studied here.

The point where Pannenberg and Moltma.nn agree is stated

as follows: "The event of Jesus is not only the chief paradigm in the
consciousness of the Christian believer, but public evidence available
in history and having a claim on reason's effort to conceive the structure of reality. 11 21
It was noted above in Chapter II that Moltmann had found a method
of hermeneutical investigation which went beyond the historicists' use
of the principle of analogy i n helping him to theologize.

21

Ibid., p. 37.

This method

--------~
begins with the history of traditions.

It goes beyond Niebuhr's two

alternatives mentioned in Chapter II, but it accepts one heretofore unmentioned idea of Niebuhr's; namely, that the path of theological knowledge must begin with historical particulars, then move to the universal
and eschatological.22 Niebuhr had said that the crucifixion and resurrection traditions occupy an "unassailable centrality" in the form . of the
entire New Testament history.23 Moltmann agrees that these events are the
starting point for investigating the New Testament.

From this point the

road leands outward to the context, in agreement with Pannenberg's
procedure;
All theological questions and answers are meaningful only
within the framework of the history which God has with
humanity and through humanity with His whole creation--the
history moving toward a future still hidden from the world
but already revealed in Jesus Christ.24
And here the question might arise whether God and His acts are really
the subject matter of the historian.

At least one important modern ·

philosopher of history, R. G. Collingwood, has denied the status of
history to traditions involving God.
to task for his contention.

Pannenberg has taken Collingwood

Moltmann does not come to grips with

Collingwoed's contention in Theology of Hope, but he assumes, as Pannenberg has done, that the traditions are data.

22Moltrnann, P• 141.
23R. R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1,57), P· 73.
24Pannenberg, P• 314.
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The path of theological knowledge finds a center in the Holy Scriptures,
then moves outward to wider and wider contexts, using material from each
wider context, but interpreting all of it in the light of the center.
For Moltmann, (not necessarily for Pannenberg), this center is the
"future of Jesus Christ."
The centre of the New Testament scriptures is the future of
the risen Christ, which they announce, point forward to, and
promise. Thus if we are to understand the biblical scriptures
in their proclamation, their understanding of existence and
their understanding of the worldA then we must look in the same
direction as they themselves do.G5
In the first century context, Moltmann points to two facts that surround
the event of Jesus Christ, that his God was Yahweh, and that He was a
Jew.

'l'herefor.e the proper interpretation of the New Testament is the

investigation of its continuity with and contradiction to the Old
Testament. 2 ' The Old Testament, in turn, is investigated using history
of traditions, and as a result the theme of promise and fulfillment is
singled out for its continuity in New Testament-theology.

This will be

explained more completely in the first section of Chapt~r "IV.
The next wider context is the setting of the ancient church in
which the New Testament Scriptures arose.

At this point, it was ob-

served above, there was a continuity gap between the "historical Jesus"
and the risen Christ.

Carl Braaten, one of the earliest interpreters

of both Moltmann and Pannenberg, in attempting to explain their viewpoints has brought the gap down to the New Testament center when he states

2 5Moltmann, p. 28).
26Ibid • , p. 14 1 •

a
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The question of the continuity between the Easter kerygma and
the historical Jesus • • • cannot be answered unless one grasps
the connection between Jesus• own claim to authority an~ God's
vindication of that claim by raising Him from the dead. 7
Here, Braaten, without saying so, has already interpreted the continuity
between the Old and the New Testaments, between the "historical Jesus"
and the risen Christ, and between Jesus Christ and the earliest church
according to Pannenberg and ~~ltmann's method of the history of traditions.

He shows how Moltmann has picked up the promise--fulfillment

theme, and developed the New Testament events under it using the
nomenclature of

11

claim 11 and "vindication."

So far it has only been noted that the promise--fulfillment theme
is a major tradition of the Old Testament that carries over into the
New.

..

It would appear that Uberlieferungsgeschichte is being employed

according to what was called the "first translation" above at the
beginning of this chapter.

In the next chapter, using material from

Walter Zimmerli and Gerhard von Rad, Moltmann will be shown as using

..

Uberlieferungsgechichte the other way, as the history of the transmission
of traditions, especially in the relationships between the prophets
and the apocalypticists, and betw~en the apocalypticists and the
apostles.

But for the purposes of this chapter, this author wants

to do justice to the material in Theology of Hope which comes close
to, but does not settle on, using the promise--fulfillrnent scheme
developed in Pannenberg 1 s earlier words, as a "philosophical underpinning"

27Braaten, PP• 9J-94.
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for 1-bltmann.

Some of the "philosophical underpinning" is to be found

in the following paragraph:
Within the reality characterized by the constantly creative
work of God, history arises because .God makes promises and
fulfills these promises. History is event so suspended in
tension between promise and fulfillment that through the
promise it i~ irreversibly pointed toward the goal of r'ut:.ur~
fulfillment. 8
According to this view, history is a series of events suspended between
a divine promise and its fulfillment.

What people think and do, especially

what they think, within that tension, are the facts of history.
and fulfillment give direction to human thoughts.

Promise

Collingwood, if he

believed in promise and fulfillment, would say that these provide the

"inside" of each event.

It can be said that for Moltmann they provide

the dynamic of all history.

Since any distinction between subject and

object, between sacred and secular, has already been ruled out, the
activity of God in promising and fulfilling becomes the dynamic of
universal history.
'This is not Moltmann 's final word on the subject.

There is

another dynamic tension of cross and resurrection which, as mentioned
before, provides a dialectical dimension td history for Moltrnann. But
for the Biblical interpreter, this dialectical dimension is formed by
promises and moves through to fulfil.Jm.ents.

Certainly Neuhaus is only

partly right when he claims that Pannenberg supplies the "philosophical
underpinnings" for the Theology of Hope, but, as has been demonstrated,

28

Pannenberg, p. 317.
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Moltmann does use the promise--fulfillment theme in developing his
biblical interpretations, and does so in a way that is basically in
agreement with Pannenberg.
Let us return to the Jewish context of the center of the i~ew
Testament and investigate another direction in which the promise--fulfillment theme will lead.

As was noted above in Chapter II, Albert

Schweitzer brought an end to the old quest for the historical Jesus by
pointing out the apocalyptic nature of Jesus' message.

He found the

center of Jesus' message to be its continuity with and difference
from the intertestamental apocalyptic expectations.

Of course, this

apocalyptic tradition is a datum for the historian of traditions, and
since Jesus was a first-century Jew it is also a portion of His irrunediate context, of His milieu.

Every milieu has a leading edge which,

Pannenberg develops as a "horizon of expectation."

In Grundzlige der

Christologie Pannenberg discussed apocalyptic themes according to this
idea of a moving horizon. 29 Moltmann has found in that idea another
"philosophical underpinning" for his theology of hope.

0uch a "horizon"

is also a bridge; as, for example, in the words
Without the horizon of apocalyptic expectation we could not
grasp just why the man Jesus should be the final revelation
of God, why in him and only in him ~od himself should have
appeared • • • • If this horizon should disappear, then the
foundation of faith is lost, then Christology becomes mythology, and it no longer ~s any continuity with Jesus or the
witness of the apostles.

29Braaten, p. 102.
30rbid.
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Here we see the inner working of the history of traditions: a
tradit ion is a public understanding and interpreta tion of some aspect
of life.

As these understandings and interpretations change, as they do

whenever the milieu changes, public expectations of the future change in
the same directions.

History is never static, but the historian can iso-

late so small a segment of it that the amount of change is not a significant factor in understanding it, just as a photographer's product is not
influenced by the rotation of the earth.

Thus the moving and changing

public traditions of a given period can be isolated for investigation
by the historian.

The furthest possible range of public expectations

within the segment selected for study constitutes the horizon, the limi t
of vision.

Specifically, the apocalyptic horizon of expectation was, in

Jesus' day , the limit of public vision into the future.

Apocalyptic

tradition understood the resurrection of the dead as an end-time event.
This fact is "an abiding presupposition of Jesus' significance for all
later times, 11 31 not only for Pannenberg, but alse for Moltmann and any
other historian of traditions.
Thus Braaten states 1foltmann I s conclusion,
In post-exilic apocalypticism the idea of the resurrection of all
the dead is an element in its theology of universal history • • • •
When the early Christians spoke of the resurrection of Jesus of
Nazareth, as those who shared the apocalyptic expectations of a
general resurrection of all the dead at the end of the world,
they knew they were speaking eschatologically.
The question
they would ask is not whether the ·resurrection could happen, but

whether it had already happened. If it has happened, it is
a world-historical event of eschatological significance.32
This is history of traditions at work.

This is the discipline

..

referred to above by the "first translation" of Uberlieferungsgeschichte,
the cataloging of themes and cross-referencing of items in the milieu.
Here the interpreter selects his slice of history, in this case first
century Judaism, isolates it from the rest of history, looks for a theological theme, in this case the resurrection, and examines the resurrection tradition.

The first-century Jew expected a resurrection.

The

predication of a resurrection to Jesus, within that horizon of expectation, constituted an announcement that divine promises has been fulfilled
in His very Person.

This announcement also has significance today, though

the horizon of expectation is different.

For the modern interpreter

of the New Testament the history of traditions has contributed an understanding of what might otherwise be a difficult part of the Christian
message.

Moltmann is greatly concerned to bridge the gap between the

First Century in which the New Testament arose and the present time in
which the interpreter must work.
ditions to span the chasm.

Again, he has used the history of tra-

One theme of the Old Testament is the link

between promise and purpose, between call and mission.

As Abraham was

called, as the promise was announced to him, so was his mission.

Like-

wise the prophets, receiving their calls, were sent to do a specific
job.

So it is with the "auditory visions" of the risen Christ.

3 2 Ibid.

The
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apostles are literally

d.ft~ trtt>J.._.,'I ,

sent away from Christ to the

world.t4oltmann says,
The link between coming history and past history is provided
in the light of this forward-moving, historic mission. The
connection between then and now in the history of tradition
is a connection in the history of promise and of mission;
for tradition, as Christians understand it, means mission
that moves forward and outward. The word-event in which
past events are brought to expression means the event of
being called to the future of salvation in Christ and to
the present labour of hope in the service of reconciliation.33
A word of explanation is warranted here.
mission?

The term

ff<!-f'jJ o<rt}

How does tradition mean

in the writings of Paul refers to

the content of the apostle's proclamation.

Moltmann is assuming that

his readers are familiar 'A·i th that term, and with that content; for
Paul's proclamation, like his letters, can usually be divided into
credenda and agenda.

Just as the content of the Old Testament tradi-

tions dealt with a word to be proclaimed, a land to be possessed, a
people to be called, a city to be warned, and various other agenda that
accompany the promises themselves, so the Christian understands his
tradition in the twentieth century in terms of agenda, that is, "the
present labour of hope in the service of reconciliation. 11
History of traditions can also be used in theological polemics.
Moltmann uses it so early in Theology of Hope.

Karl Barth had asserted

that revelation had to be separated from Scripture in so far as Scripture was simply a written report, an historical datwn, something in the

33 Moltmann, p. 284.
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"objective" realm.
Holy Spirit.

Kreck applied this principle to the doctrine of the

Kreck actually separated revelation from the Holy Spirit.

In reply, Moltmann points out that the Holy 0pirit, investigated by history of traditions, is Himself part of the event of Jesus Christ; He is
"historical and eschatological.

the Spirit of the resurrection of

the dead. 11 34 Consequently no one has the right to separate the Spirit
from the Scripture, or "subjective" from "objective" revelation.
So

the first step in solving the problem, posed by the way the

historicist school used the principle of analogy, was for Moltmann to
find a methodology in which historically-conscious theology can interpret the Holy Scriptures.

Moltmann believes that the history of tra-

ditions serves that end.
The theology of history with its "language of the facts" does
not mean bruta facta, which present themselves to the positivistic historian as the end-products abstracted from tradition,
but means the divine "language of the facts in that context
of tradition and expectation in which the events take place."
In this sense, "history is always the history of traditions."
(Geschichte is the German term). History of tradition is in
fact to be regarded as the profounder term for history (Geschichte)
as such. The events which reveal God must be taken in and with
the context in tradition in which they took place and a1gng
with which alone they have their original significance.
This drives toward the center of Moltmann's theology of hope.

It

bridges the gaps in continuity, it answers Schweitzer's contention that

34Ibid., pp. 56-5?.
to this writer.
35Ibid., pp. 80-81.

Kreck's identity has not yet oecome available

the "historical Jesus" is meaningless, and it provides a basis for
apologetics and polemics.

One more point needs to be made.

The his-

tory of traditions also serves to lead Moltmann to his ontological
understanding of eschatology as the dynamic of history.
closer to the second

Here we get

..
translation of Uberlieferungsgeschichte,

the

"history of the transmission of tra dition, 11 or really, of the "handing
down" of the "downhanded."
Applying this history of the transmission of tradition to the Old
Testament porphetic books, Moltmann is led to the following observations:
The message of these (classical) prophets arises in the shadow
of the increasing menace from Assyria, Babylon, and Persia, the
gathering storm of destruction that broods over the national,
political, and Palestinian life of Israel's existence and ef the
whole history of promise and fulfillment thus far vouchsafed to
Israel by God. They interpret this histoJl of collapse as
Yahweh's judgment on his apostate people.
One might be tempted to stop at this point and accuse M:olt{(lann of
confusing trend analysis with proclamation, but as one reads on he
sees the deeper, tradition-historical analysis that he really has
in store for his readers.

He says, for example,

This means that the new historic action of Yahweh in the
history of nations, which for Israel becomes the history
of its destruction, is seen by then as being on the same
level as, and even competing with, the historic acts of
Yahweh in thei5 own past as remembered in the cultus and
the festivals. 7

J'Ibid., p. 127.

__,

37rbid

-
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Here one might expect to find an existential or crisis-theological
answer, but Moltmann continues,
This new, and as yet dark and unfathomable action of Yahweh
will even go to the length of outreaching and replacing his
past actions upon his people. In the historic judgment of
Israel, Yahweh not only annuls the debts of Israel, but'·he
annuls also the institutions of his o~ covenant in his unfathomable freedom to adopt new ways.
So the message of doom from the classical prophets of Israel,
interpreted by the history of the transmission of traditions, proclaims further promises which place hope before the hearers and extend the horizon of their expectations into the future.

The de struc-

tion becomes a sign of the eschaton, hope remains in effect, and fulfillment is not conswmnated, but made even more universal and eschatological than in the previous form of the tradition.
To summa.rize Noltmann's methodological solution, the discipline
of "history of traditions" uses data which are comprehensible outside
of the theologians subculture while remaining amenable to the eschatological content of the traditions it studies.

By placing the traditions

in dialogue with one another, Moltmann has fashioned a hermeneutical
tool to help bridge the gaps that break the continuity of the Bible.
Moreover, Moltmann takes seriously the contradictions implicit in the
gaps, especially the contradiction between the cross and the risen
Christ.

These antitheses are the matter which f'ioltmann's dialectical-

critical method treats.

Because the history of traditions includes

51
the study of past horizons of expectation, the partial fulfillments,
and the "over-spills," it is adequate for a dialectical' understanding
of history.

CHAPTER IV
::,OLUTIONS OFFERED IN THEOLOGY OF HOPE

Eschatology
The content of the traditions
In the previous chapter Jurgen Moltmann's procedure of history of
traditic;,ns was explained.

In this chapter the content of those tra-

ditions will be sifted in order to uncover what for Moltmann is their
precious kernel, namely eschatology.

Since Holtmann is not a biblical

scholar himself, but a systematician, he relies on Gerhard von Rad and
Walter Zimmerli for mast of his Old Testament exegesis.

The author

has also had recourse to von Rad and Zimmerli in order to examine
Moltmann's use of his exegetical sources.
the citations in this chapter.

This will become evident from

In the portion of this chapter that

deals with the apocalyptic tradition, this author has relied on D.S.
Russell for background information.
Just what is it in the content of the traditions which Moltmann
studies that fonns the basis of his e:xp4nation of history?

What is

the underlying scheme that supports his historical hermeneutics?

The

answer in Theology of Hope is clear: the traditions are based on Yahious fulfillments experienced by Israel, each
weh's promises and the Var
. ·t
w hope for a new "horizon of
new fulfillment carrying wit hin l. a ne
romise-fulfillment scheme is the hermeneutical
expectation." This P
t
of the Old Testament.
key to the his ory
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Moltmann accepts Zirnmerli's analysis of the promise traditions in
the Torah.

These might be briefly summarized as follows: The Abra-

hami tic promise goes beyond the possession of the land and the increase
of the patriarch's descendants.

A fullness of blessing is announced

for the history of Israel, a wholeness that constitutes a univers al
counter-history to the world-wide history of curse begi nning in Genesis

J,

1

As far ba ck as the patriarchs the Yahwist has a lready sown the

seeds of tension that force the post-conquest Israelite to look into
the future for a greater realization of the promise.

The Priestly

account of the same event frames the Abrahamitic promise in covenant
terms by pla cing here the fonnulary promise,

11

I will be your God, 11

though reserving for the exodus account the corrollary, "You shall be
my people." As was the case with the Yahwist, so with the Priests the
promise-fulfillment tension does not end with the conquest of the land. 2
.
.
According to Zinunerli's presentation of the promise and fulfillment
scheme, the will of God becomes event in the following:
All Old Testament history, insofar as it is history guided and
given by Yahweh's word, receives the character of the fulfillment; but in the fulfillment it receives a new character as
promise)

1W
alter L.immerli, "Promise and Fulfillment, 11 translated by James

Wharton, Essays on Old 'f estament Hermeneutics (Richmond: John Knox
Press, 1%&), pp. ,2-,J. This work, copyrighted by M. E. Bratcher, 1,&3,
was originaliy published as Probleme alttestamentlicher Hermeneutik
(Munchen: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960).
2Ibid.

1,,1~

3Jurgen Moltmann, 1heolo,: of Hope, t r anslated by James W. Leitch
(New York, Harper & Row,
p. 10,.
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M::>ltmann using almost the same scheme, attributes this "look into
the future" inherent in every fulfillment to an "overspill that points
to the future"4 which remains after every fulfillment event.

For Holt-

mann, who views the Old Testament promise traditions from the "horizon
of expectation standpoint," promise becomes the hermeneutical key to
history and the events (Geschehen) that take place in history (Geschichte).
Moltmann says,
It could perhaps be said that the promises enter into fulfillment in events, yet are not completely resolved in any
event, but there remains an overspill that points to the
future. That is why reality (\-Jirklichkeit) as is comes and
is awaited and as it passes and is left behind, is experienced
as histon (Geschichte), and not as a cosmic and ever-recurring
constant.'
The result of this "oversphill" (Vberschuss) is that each generation
of theologians has new eschatological homework to do as well as new historical data to incorporate into his corpus of promise tradition.

He

must bring the new horizon of expectation to bear on the traditions;
this task is called "hermeneutics." He must also bring the promise
traditions to bear on the new horizon of expectation; this task is
called "eschatology." Moltmann gives us an example of "eschatologianhermeneuticians" at work in Theology o f ~ by comparing and contrasting
the eschatology of the prophets with that of the apocalypticists, seeking
"systematic consequences" for modern eschatology.,

4 z·1.mmerli , p. 112.
5Moltmann, p. 10~.
•Ibid., p. 135
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Prephetic eschatology
For his analysis of the content of the prophetic traditions
Meltmann relies on von Rad's investigation, especially on his magnum
opus, Old Testament Theology.

This does not mean that von Rad and

Moltmann are in essential agreement about everything they treat.

Von

Rad is much less sure of what he means by "eschatology" than Moltmann,
and he usually hedges the term about with qualifications.

But both

are concerned about history, and both work with the horizon concept.
According to von Rad,
The message of the prophets has to be termed eschatological
wherever it regards the old historical bases of salvation
as null and void. But we ought then to go on and limit the
term. It should not be applied to cases where Israel gave
a general expression of her faith in her future, or, as does
happen, in the future of one of her sacred institutions. The
prophetic teaching is only eschatological when the prophets
expelled Israel from the safety of the old saving actions
and suddenly shi~ed the basis of salva tion to a future action
of God.?
In other words, the horizon of expectation moved beyond another hill,
the future of Israel was no longer dependent on the Davidic kingship,
or the Temple worship, or the pilgrimages, but would be open to new
ways of fulfillment after the purgatorial period.
But prophetic eschatology is not only the continuing vision of the
passing away of the Old and the coming of the New.

The promise is part

of the old tradition: the God who promises i s the God who has promised.

Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theolog,y_, tra nslatea· b o 1· G
L
)
Y • 'I.
•
Stalker ( New York: Harper & Row, 1~G5,
II, - 118.

The prophets of Israel, therefore, related the future actions of God to
the promise traditions.

Von Rad calls the prophetic messa ge a "g reat

continuing dialogue" with the election traditions. 8
On the one hand, we see with what fo r ce and ardour the prophets

catch up these election traditions in their preaching; on the
other, their relationship to them is a broken one; for they regard the coming judgment a s sealing the end ef Israel's present
existence; the secur.ity given her by the election traditions is
cancelled out by her guilt. The only thing she can hold on to
is a new historical act on the part of Yahweh, the outlines of
which the prophets already see, and to which they point with
kindled emotions.,
Such a message fulfills the requirements than von Had ha d so cauti ously
set to make a proclamation eschatological.

Von Rad goes on to indicate

the other side of the dialogue: that the forms of the new act of Yahweh
are taken from the election traditions.1° But the preaching of the prophets would have been eschatological whether the new acts were similar to
the form of the old or not.

The essential thing to note is that the

promise was not fully complemented by any past election event.

Moltmann

has peinted out that the question in the mind of Israel was "Where has
the 'God of the promise I revealed His faithfulness ? u 11 He agrees tha t the
classical prophets were answering that question when they cast their
specific eschatology.

He relies on von liad's exegesis, to show how

"that classical prophecy is a specific characteristic of I sra elite belief in the promise. 1112

8 Ibid., II, 117.
c;Ibid.
16Ibid.
11 Moltmann, p. 43
12
Ibid., p. 125.
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Previously in this paper the judgment announced by the prophets
was referred to as "purgatorial."

Perhaps this tenn was unfortunate,

insofar as it can be misinterpreted in an over-individualistic or
particularistic way.

Moltmann does not see the judgment of Israel as

• purgation of individuals, or even of a culture whose only corruption
is in what the Scholastics would have called "accident. 11 The prophets
themselves hardly offer the opportunity for such an interpretation within
their writings.

Even the "remnant 11 passages prefer the image of the

truncated stump to any kind of cleansing imagery, and Amos even pictures
the remnant as the barely-recognizab~e scraps left over from a lion's
meal (J:12).

Nevertheless, there is hope in the eschatology of the

classical prophets.

Moltmann says

This judgment certainly means the annihilation of the people
and of the history to which this people owes its existence,
but it does not mean the annihilation of Yahweh's faithfulness to himself. It can therefore be conceived as a judgmen~
that paves the way for something finally ~ew, and. as annihilatian for the sake of greater perfection. 1
The term "finally new" is important.

For Holtmann, unlike von

Rad, the truly eschatological is not announced unless there is a dimension of ultimacy, of universality.

The visions of the end which the

prophets portray include the neighboring Gentiles as well as the people
of Israel.

Moltmann is willing to call the prophetic message "escha-

tological II only because of this aspect. 14 So, in the prophets, the material from the election traditions is brought to bear on the new horizon

lJibid., p. 12,.
14Ibid.
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of the annihil .
ation of Israel as a nation. The resultant new traditions
Present
an eschatological hope not only Israel, but for the Gentiles as
Well.
Jewish Apocalyptic eschatology
The field of Jewish Apocalyptic writings has not been so well
described by modeni investigators as that of the Prophets.

In many

ways one can see Holtmann doing original work on this subject in Theolo-

gy of Hope.

For some of his ideas he claims dependence on Pannenberg,

for other dependence on Rolff Hendtorff.

The chief reason that the Apocalyptic writings are reviewed in
this paper is that they might be compared with the Prophetic writings
in order to find what Holtmann calls the "systematic consequences" for
modern eschatology.

See .Moltma.nn believes that the modern theologian

is in a similar position to the Apocalyptic writers, and that the tradltion he has to work with is similar to the Prophetic tradition.

Hence

there is a practical lesson for the present-day interpreter in understanding the way the Apocalyptic writers used their material.
Gerhard von Rad lists three main characteristics of Apocalyptic
literature.

There are dualism, transcendentalism, and secrecy. 1 5 Its

dualism is more chronological than topological.

It does not consist so

much in "heaven and earth" as in "the present (evil) age," and the
coming time of goodness, righteousness, victory for those who love God,

15
von Rad, II, )01-JOJ.

and punishment for those who oppose Him.
not completely exclude the earth.

Its transcendentalism does

1~ere are politi~al and social conse-

quences on the earth that reflect the really important decisions which
are being made else\·,here.
Gno~ticism, the need for
cryptic message.

Secrecy includes the elements of later
11

wisdorn 11 in order to understand ciphers and

1~is not the wisdom of Job, Ecclesiastes, or

Proverbs, but rather the kind discussed in Rev. 13:18, the wisdom one
needs to decipher the "numuer of the beast. 11
It is significant that Apocalyptic writings never refer to
themselves as

11

prophecy. 11

They have no reot in the election traditions.

They reveal no concern with Israel's history but rather with secular
empires or even '"ith creation as a whole.

Like the Ezekiel tradition,

Apocalyptic has a "son of man" but he is a celestial being, not a
prophet in any sense.16
Lest too much emphasis be placed on the differences bet~een the
Prophets and the Apocalypticists, it should be point~d out that both
are unquestionably concerned with ethics.
ers to behave in a prescribed way.

They encourage their read-

Daniel (4:27) even seems to uni-

versalize theology and ethics.17 In Apocalyptic, however, the content
is different, the encouragement is more toward ma.rtydom than toward
reformation.

1,Ibid .
17n. S. Russell, The Method and Messa e of Jewish A ocal
(Philadelphia: \,estminster, SCM Press, Ltd., 1,64 , p. 102.

tic

In one impartant way -the Apocalyptic writers are closer to the
Pharisees than to the classical prophets: they consider the written
Torah to be the revelation of God to His people.

This Torah is central

to their thinking and conduct. 18 In The Manual of Discipline, Chapter I,
of the Dead Sea literature we can see how an individual becomes
apocalyptically bound to life in the Torah in the hope of eschatological consequences for himself.
Moltmann seizes upon the universal aspect to show how Apocalypticism
developed from prophecy;
But the more the new saving action of God that is to come outstrips all analogies from the history of Israel's dealings with
God in past experience and traditions, and the more the judg~ent that begins with Israel moves on through the history of
the nations, the more clearly there appears the first signs of
a universal eschatology of mankind. Here, however, we have
presumably already the beginning of what must be called apocalyptic. 1'
The Apocalyptic writers were the first to discribe a divine kingdom
which was greater than Israel.

It was a kingdom for "the righteous."

Israel has a role to play in it, but is no longer synonymous with "the
righteous."
Von Rad, and even Pannenberg, look on Apocalyptic literature as
"application of cosmological patterns to history."
breaks with his acknowledged mentors.

Here, 1-bltmann

for Moltrnann Jewish Apocalyptic

writers begin with eschatology, and then give "an eschatological and
historic interpretation to the cosmos. 1126 He says,

18 Ibid. , p.

1,

2,.

Moltmann., p. 130.

26

lli.Q.., p. 13G.

It might well be that the existing cosIIll.c bounds of reality
which the moving historic horizon of the promise reaches in'
eschatology, are not regarded as fixed and pre-de~ermined
things, but are themselves to be founa in motion."- 1
Such a statement .would be unthinkable for the existential theologians.
Here one might identify Moltmann' s position with what Reinhold Niebuhr
called "human destiny" and set his against what Niebuhr called "human
nature. 11

If Moltmann's conclus ions are correct, man has no nature but

only a destiny, similar to what Ortega-y-Gasset calls man's "history ,
and coming close to ~artrian
well as the social
all security.

11

mankind. 11

11

11

self-determination 11 for the physical as
This is a g round of hope at the price of

Such a doctrine not only set Moltmann a gainst a theo-

logical interpretation of "human nature , 11 but against Carwin, Freud,
Marx, and the Positivists as well.

In fact it puts Holtmann very close

to the American Fundamentalists if he follows through this vision of
ultimacy and if one takes traditional biblical language to describe it.
Underneath the newness of Moltmann's claim that the cosmic bounds
of reality are in motion lies an answer to R.R. Niebuhr's riddle which
was described in Chapter II above.

There the discussion involved

Moltma.nn's hesitation to accept the presuppositions of the dialectical
theologians.

R.R. Niebuhr had asked, "Can the tension in Christianity's

historical consciousnes s •• , be resolved before that consciousness
enters into the additional work of examining the conditions of its own
awareness? 11 22 i''ioltmann answers "No. 11

The church must be aware that its

21 Ibid.
22R. R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historica l Reason (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), P• 34.

consciousness is normed not by an investigation of nature bu~ by promise.
It is formed not by understanding, but by hope.

Although Moltmann is

never quite clear as to whether he is posing an epistemological or a

metaphysical question, or both, one must admit that his willingness to
share first-century conceptuality in order to get at the eschatological
core of the Apocalyptic message is remarkably unique.

Different as it

may be, however, it is a necessary step in understanding Apocalyptic,
because, as he himself says,
Only if the whole historical picture--contingency and continui ty--can be shown to be contingent should we come within
sight of the eschatologically new fact of the resurrection
of Christ. The resurrection of Christ does not mean a possibility for the world--for existence and for history. When
the world is understoad as a contingent creation by God, then
the resurrection becomes intelligible as a new creation. 23
The analogy between Apocalyptic eschatology and that of l'ioltmann is
something like this: the Apocalypticist ·saw in the future a new horizon
of fulfillment for God's promises made to Israel; it embraced all nations
as included in God's activity of blessing.

Therefore the apocalyptic

writers went beyond the Prophets in their preaching and writing.

Today

r-1oltmann sees a new horizon of fulfillment beyond that described in
contemporary 1rword II or
scribe it.

II

faith II theology; so he needs new terms to de-

Notice that his "new possibility for the world" theme is

thoroughly dualistic, completely universal in scope, and, at least in
the latter part of Theology of Hope ("Exodus Church"), framed in an

23 Moltma.nn, p. 17,.

ethics of martyrdom.

There are differences between Moltmann's work

and Jewish Apocalyptic.
tice pseud9nymity.

~bltma.nn does not deal in cryptograms or prac-

Nor is tfoltmann disengaged from positivistic

"demythologization."

Perhaps the ultimate question for Moltmann's

disciples will not be their relationship to curr.ent secular philosophies,
but what they are to do with myth.

This is a conjecture, however.

The

important point to note is that Msltmann not only tells us, but shows us
how, by his own example, the modern church theologian can develop an
eschatology of history more adequate to his horizon of expectation than
that presented to him by the previous horizon's school, and that he
shows us this by an additional, more biblical example, of the Apocalypticists developing a new form of theology to present a horizon of
expectation which the classical prophets could not see.
F.aster eschatology
In the Bible there remains one more eschatological tradition, that
of the New Testament.
tradition.

This follows and builds upon the Apocalyptic

The relationship between the r..:aster and Apocalyptic escha-

tologies is different from that between Prophetic and Apocalyptic in
that, whereas it took a long time for the Hebrews to move from the
Prophetic to the Apocalyptic, it took only one sudden event for the
Church to move from Apocalyptic to New Testament eschatology.
was the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus.

1bat event

As a result there is

far more interplay between Apocalyptic and Easter eschatology than
there is between Prophetic and Apocalyptic.

'!'he very idea of resurrection is a main theme of Apocalyptic
eschatology.

It is the expected event that ushers in the !Jew Age, or

the kingdom of the Righteous.

Russell interprets Is. 26:1, and Dan.

12:2-3, both of which are resurrection passages., lJ.S explanations of

the kingdom which is the lot of the righteous.

He :-,ssumes that the

risen bodies a re identical to the former physical uodies, and that an
everlasting kingdom is to be established upon the earth.21.i. Hussell's is
by no means the only view.

In the Pseudepigrapha many other interpre-

tations of the resurrection are offered.
others . all ~en.

Some include only the righteous,

Some involve the physical body, others variously

describe "spiritual bodies. 11 25 But in all the biblical and Pseudepigraphic accounts there is an ultimacy, an eschatological finality, a
sense of the end that ac·c ompanies the resurrection.
This does not mean that there is no cormection between the earlier
eschatology of the classical prophets and the resurrection of Jesus.
Indeed, there seems to be a progression from the earthy, rough visions
of Ezekiel 37 and Deutero-Isaiah, carried through the romantic notions
of the end-time one finds in Zechariah, on into the bizarre pictures of
the Apocalypticist, then finally emerging in the New Testament with the
good news that the resurrection has happened in the case of Jesus.
Zimmerli sees the resurrection of Jesus as a "renmant-event of
Israel. 1126 For Zi1IDDerli the election-history of Israel has been concentrated in the personal life of Jesus.

24Russell, p. 376.

-

2 5Ibid.
26 zimmerli, p. 113.

In the person of Jesus, Israel
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undergoes its deepest hwniliation and at the same time the strongest
confirmation of its election. 27 As the Prophets had said, the old covenant must come to an end; a new covenant is to take its place.

As the

Prophets had used language of the Exodus to describe Israel's new
relationship to God, so the Apostles used language of the Prophets to
describe the crucifixion-resurrection event.

Jesus is called the Christ

( Davidic tradition), and the Kyrios, which may mean "Yahweh" but may also
mean the godly conterpart of Caesar.

This last became the most impor-

tant title because of its universality.

Zimmerli, with Oscar Cullman

and several others, does not stop with the reduction of the body of the
elect to a single person, but goes beyond this to the new Israel which
Jesus has chosen, the "Israel of God" which is different from "Israel
after the flesh."

Zimmerli says,

11

Now, however, the covenant is es-

tablished in a freedom which involves the extending of an invitation to
those who stand without. 1128 And, indeed, why not?

If Jesus, and Jesus

alone, was the Sha'are Zedek, then Jesus, and Jesus alone has the real
authority to invite, to judge Israel and to determine who belongs to it
and who does not.
Moltmann, by contrast, does not develop the "True Israel" or the
"Remnant" themes.

He concentrates on the promise and fulfillment scheme

described above in Chapter III.

He does so against the background of

positivism, taking great care to prevent the confusion of nature with

27Ibid.
28Ibid.

''
history.

He is greatly concerned with the threat of death as a thwart

to the fulfillment of the promise, and sees the resurrection tradition
as a solution to this problem.
Thus in Israel the idea of "raising of the
in the first instance within the framework
promise: it is not a case of natural tsic)
fulfilling of Yahweh's promises of life in
the promise. 2 '

dead" is formulated
of the religion of
reanimation, but of
the dead bearer of

Moltmann's "bearer of the promise" is very close to Zi1M1erli 1 s true
renmant of Israel. 11
It is not until the Apocalyptic writers that the "raising of
the dead" is understood in universal terms, in the sense that
even beyond death this God will achiev~ his judgment and his
due in both righteous and unrighteous.JO
Nothing must stand between the promise and the fulfillment.
death tries to interfere it is overcome.

Even when

In fact, Moltmann's claim is

The late Israelite ideas of creatio ex nihilo and resurrectio
mortuorum mark the eschatological extremities of the religion
of promise.31

In the New Testament one has the additional announcement that the
resurrection did indeed happen to Jesus of Nazareth.

This, for Moltmann,

"must be understood as the eschatological coming to pass of the faithfulness of God, and at the same time as the eschatological authentication
of his promise and the dawning of its fulfillment • 11 32 That is how Molt-

mann uses the history of traditions.

He has taken the exegetical data

from von Rad, Zimmerli, and others and framed the conclusions in the
language of systematic theology.

2 'Moltmann, pp. 20,-210.
JQibid.

3 1rbid.
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Formulation of an eschatological understanding of history
In order to make his systematic theological sta tements, Moltmann
appli es the content of the traditions dialectica lly t o the questions of
contempora ry philosophy.

According to t-bltmann himself he stands vis-a-

vis the philosophers with an eschatological-theological, and therefore
non-philosophical answer.

According to Braaten, Moltmann's answer is

dependent on the philosophy of Ernst Bloch.

I n a sens e they a re both

r i ght, for Bloch's philosophy has an eschatologica l element, while
Moltmann's theology goes beyond Bloch to apply biblical traditions.
Humanism, hope, and wish-fulfillment
Philosophy's side of the "dialogue" presents the questions with
which contempora ry man is wrestling.

One large constellation of these

questions surrounds the central one: "What does it mean to be human?"
Samuel Keen analyzes this as follows:
Modern man is rejecting the traditional notion that human life
has only limited creative potentialities becaus e the world into
which man emerges already has meaning and value. Therefore life
is viewed not as a gi~ but as a burden, and the world as a
neutral arena of blind physical laws. Man must assume responsibility for creating mj'.f1ing. r·ian has claimed the divine
attributes for himself.
Theology is hard pressed to explain what it means to be human because
the ques tion is so bound up with static ideas about "nature."

Moltrnann,

and many other theologians, would like to be able to stand up and bear

33sam Keen, "Hope in a Posthuman J.:.:ra, 11 New Theology, edited by
.Martin Marty and C-ean Peerman (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1%8),
v, 81.

..
their side of the dialogue, but the nature of the uiblical material,
especially the promises, forbids any static view of humanity in the
world.

The promises are eschatological, and Moltmann insists that the

contemporary theologian's side of the dialogue must also be eschatological.
Right now humanity is incomplete.

TheoloeY will be able to give a

better answer if the question were, "What will humanity be?"

The an-

swer to that ·question puts us into the rea lm of hope.
C~ring ~he age of Positivism the very idea of hope aroused
suspicion because of the Freudian doctrine of wish-fulfillment.

Keen

has been careful to distinguish between hope and wish-fulfillment, as
one can see in this passage from the essay cited above:
The optimist conspires to ignore the facts because they suggest
an interpretation he does not want to make. Contrariwise, the
believer's affirmation of a ground of hope is made in the knowledge that by all realistic calculations human history is utterly
tragic. It is in the light of this certain knowledge· that the
believer sets himself to examine his experience to detennine
whether there is any basis for toping that what is penultimately
the case is not untimately so. 3
Moltmann goes a step beyond this.

He says that the Positivist has

ignored valid evidence, namely, the historical fact of the resurrection
of Jesus Christ.

Thus there is evidence against the ultimacy of

"utterly tragic" human history .
Jesus Christ. 1135

.34 Ibid., V, 87.
35 Moltmann, p . 17 .

The ground of hope is the "future of

,,
Christian eschatology speaks of Jesus Christ and his future.
It recognizes the reality of the raising ef Jesus and proclaims the future of the risen Lord. Hence the question
whether all statements about the future are grounded in the
person and history of Jesus Christ provides it with the
touchstone by which t~ distinguish the spirit of eschatology
from that of utopia.3
So Moltmann has made, as his theological contribution to the dialogue,
the liberating distinction between hope and wish-fulfilment.

It is a

liberating distinction because, in contrast to Bultmann who seeks a
place for t heology a round the periphery of philosophy, Moltmann has
made an apologetic penetration of philosophy's very citadel.

Thanks to

Moltmann's boldness, theologians who build on his ideas can walk boldly
into the academy with a respect that was not afforded them there a
generation ago.
Moltmann's use of Ernst Bloch's philosophy
Part of the dialogue process between philosophy and theology
centers around what wa s described in Chapter II of this paper, in the
citation from Carl Braaten; namely, the "cultural point of contact."
Braaten made the point that Bloch's philosophy was the "non-theological
point of contact" for Moltmann's theology of hope.37 Curiously, throughout his works, Braaten never ci tes anything from I.:as Prinzip Hoffnung
which he claims is fundamental to Moltmann I s theology.

Indeed, The-

ology of Hope cites Bloch's magnum opus only three times, and the longe s t quote is a single sentence.

So rather than looking f or materi al

36,Ibid.
37s upra, Chap. II, p. 27, also fn. 44.
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which is carried over from Bloch to Moltmann, the procedure here will
be to describe Bloch's hope and see how Moltmann's hope is a theological development of it.
One will find many references to Bloch as a

II

"Hegelian" philosopher, and these have some value.
reflect something beyond Marx and Hegel.

Marxist, 11 or a
But Bloch's works

Bloch is a humanist, not in

the classical sense, as for instance Erasmus or Lorenzo Valla were,
but in a strictly modern, post-positivistic sense.

Consider the

following:
The full genesis, the genesis of human adequacy, is found
only in the prophets of the Old and New Testaments; they
alone distinguish the new aeon from the old by the cessation of bondage • • • Incipit v i t a ~ is the Dantesque
fonnula that inauguarated the new age. Its roots are in
modern economics; but no one can deny that the current
which fed the ideological gro~th of its roots, and which
made and makes even the name 'new .age' possible, rose
from the unsatisf~ed pathos of a new aeon still animated
by Christianity.3
The above passage describes a hopeful humanism that is in some
ways similar to the hope of the Apocalypticist.

Neither the Apoca-

lyptic writers nor Bloch take human nature as a given, the former because of their theocentric view of the universe, the latter, however,
from a humanistic and "atheistic" standpoint.
around the simple proverb

11

S is not yet P. 11

Nova" Bloch explains what he means by

11

Bloch's system centers
In his essay "lncipit Vita

S is not yet P, 11 namely, that

there is no subject for which the ultimate predicate may be asserted.

JSErnst Bloch, "Incipit vita nova," translated by E. !3 • .\shton,
Man on His Own (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), pp. 1,-80.
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This must be distinguished from Heraclitus view which might be sunmari.zed
as

11

S never has been, is not no\'. , and never wil l be P. 11

dynamic Positivist, but a philosopher of hope.

Bloch is not a

The e,round for hope lies

in the material universe and in the societies that develop among men whor
live in it.

In that very "arena" no subject has its adequate predica te

already.YI Bloch says, "In this impulse and course hope is moving; with
close-range objectives in mind when the long-range end is considered,
and (wi th regard to the thing that really matters) with long-range ends
in mind when the close-range objectives are in view. 11 4° Here we have a
secular use of the "horizon of expectation" concept with which iv,oltmann
and Pannenberg have been working in their theologies.
There is some evidence in 'lheolog_y of Hope that Braaten is right
in his assertion that Bloch's philosophy is a "non-theological point
of contact" for Moltmann's theology.

Consider the following:

The horizon of expectation within which a Christian doctrine
of conduct must be developed is the eschatological horizon
of expectation of the kingdom of God, of his righteousness
and his peace with a new creation, of his freedom and his
humanity for all men. This horizon alone, with its formative
effect on the present, leads a man in missionary hope to oppose and suffer under the inadequacies of the present, brings
him into conflict with the present form of society, and causes
him to discover the "cross of the present" (Hegel).41
This is no isolated paragraph.
conclusion.

It is a central part of l'k>ltmann's

He has been building up to this through all of his

exegesis, all of his analysis of the present situation, all of his polemic against Positivism.

3'Ibid., p. 90
40 Ibid.
4 1Moltmann, p. 334.

~bltmann has described the final adequate

-
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predication of humanity as the work of the promise-fulfilling God, and
the age in which people will enjoy the blessings of "the genesis of
human adequacy" as the "kingdom of God."
"Now, any modern writer" must be careful to note how he uses the
term "humanism."

There was a philosophical movement in Germany in the

early nineteenth century called Humanismus which was a romantic, idealistic and thoroughly optimistic philosophy.
might be called panthistic.

This type of humanism

Its roots lay in Renaissance humanism; its

watchword was, "The proper study of mankind is man. 114 2 Part of the
problem is that the English word "humanism" has another usage, which
constantly infiltrates the usage given above.

This latter usage ha s to

do with the study of the humanities, particularly of classical language s
and philosophies, often by people who accept the classical Greek and
Iatin values and make them their own.

A somewhat static view of the

world is usually part of that value system.

In the Renaissance, the

popular humanistic Weltanschauung was directly connected with the interest in antiquity, particularly in the Classics.

While nineteenth-

century humanism had a more sophisticated, (and, amazingly, at the same
time more romantic) form of pantheism than its fifteenth-century counterpart, even this "humanism" falls short of describing the philosophy of
Ernst Bloch.

Bloch calls himself an "atheist" rather than a pantheist.

Yet Bloch does not write like an atheist, for example, Camus.

For want

of a better term, Bloch might be described as an "anthropothei st. 11
Bloch, for all practical purposes, accepts the Bible as the Word of God;

4 2webster's New International Dictionary (2nd edition), p. 1212,
one finds this interesting definition of "Humanism": "a contemporary
cult or belief calling itself religious but substituting faith in man
for faith in God. 11
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not the Word of Jesus, Yahweh, the Trinity, and others, but the Word of
the man of the future, who is the real "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob."
If we dare to call Bloch a "hwnanist," then, it must be with this anthropotheism in mind.
This does not mean that Moltmann is an anthropotheist.
Christian theologian.

He is a

But Braaten may well be correct in his assertion

that Bloch's philosophy is a "non-theological point of contact" for
t-bltmann's theology.
There are differences between Bloch and Holtmann, however.
clear difference is in their exegesis of the Bible.
center of the Scripture is the resurrection of Jesus.

One

For Holtmann, the
As was pointed

out earlier in this chapter, the resurrection, for Moltmann, "must be
understood as the eschatological coming to pass of the faithfulness of
God. 1143 Moltmann refuses to call the intermediate fulfilments of the
divine promises

11

rnyths. 11

He does attempt to demythologize the future

promises (such as "meeting the Lord in the air") in favor of a terrestrial millenium, but the acts of God's event-creating word of promise in the past are taken seriously as the driving forces of history.
Bloch, on the other hand, finds the center of Scripture in Genesis 3,
the "subversive promise" of the snake.44 Bloch calls the content of the
temptation

11

the good news of Christian salvation."

This eritis is clearly the most subversive word in all myths
open to an anthropocentric interpretation--from the serpent
up to Prometheus, and to the resolution of all longings and

43supra, p. ,1, fn. J2.
44 Ernst Bloch, "Religious Truth," translated by ,John Cumming, Man
2!! His Own, p. 114.
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thoughts ~der God in the "third Gospel" of the Christlike
community. 5
Moltmann will have none of this.
with Bloch on this point.

He does not even enter into dialogue

The only place where Moltmann came clos e to

discussing this matter, and discussing in a very interesting mixture of
explication and implication, is in his conclusion to the section called
"Revelation and the Knowledge of God."

Here Moltmann sununons up the

specter of Genesi s by his reference to God's verdict that all things
were very good," but he applies it to the eschaton, to a utopian eschaton.
He also uses a pun here, that God stands against (entgegensteht) man
until man creates and understands a true fulfilment reality, therefore
the God who promises is an object (Gegenstand). 46 There is a philosophical similarity here to Bloch's

11

S is not yet P, 11 but not an identity.

For Moltma.nn, eschatology does not begin until the historical particularity of Israel appears on the scene, with the patriarchs and their
words of promise.

1-"·lhatever may be said 0f the antedeluvian events and

c~n~ersations belongs to aetiology and the epiphany cults.
Moltmann 1 s limited Blochism might be summarized by saying that the
rejects anthropotheism for the present even in the form of expectation.
He does so because of his intense devotion to the resurrected Lord.

Even so he is willing to project Bloch's ideas about the man of the future into his own Apocalyptic interpretation of the kingdom of God and

_4 5rbid.
4,Moltmann, p. 120.
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of the possibilities for good and evil in history which lie in the
field of hope and can be acquired only there. 47
Eschatology of history in Moltmann and Pannenberg
The most remarkable item in l;,!olfhart Pannen·o erg' s apprach to history
is that the future is metaphysically paramount.

The future is more "real"

than the present, which in turn is more "real" than the past.

Pannenberg

is willing to claim that Jesus gave similar priority to the future.
Once this is admitted, Pannenberg is able to give hope-centered interpretations to dominical logia concerning the kingdom at great variance
with both the traditional and the existential interpretations.

Thus,

according to Pannenberg, Jesus did not see the Kingdom of God as beginning with His personal presence to be fulfilled in the future, but
as beginning in the future and being realized, or fulfilled, in His
personal presence.48 Pannenberg says,

11

In this way we see the present as

an effect of the future, in contrast to the conventional assumption
that past and present are a cause of the future. 11 4CJ
Jesus proclaimed the rule of God as a reality belonging to the
future. This is the coming Kingdom. 'l'he idea .....,,~s not new,
being a conventional aspect of Jewish expectation. ',I/hat was
new was Jesus' understanding that God I s claim on the ··•orld is
to be viewed exclusively in terms of his coming rule • . Thus it

47 Ibid., p. 2e3.
48 \oiolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia:
~Jestminster Press, l'J69), p. 54.

is necessary to say, in a restricted but important sense, that
God does not yet exist. Since his rule and his being are inseparable, God's being is still in the process of coming to be.5@
For Pannenberg the priority of the future is universal.

If we currently

beg the question whether God's being and rule are inseparable, which will
be taken up in Chapter VI, and admit this presupposition so that we may
better understand the relationship between Pannenberg and Moltmann, then
the experience of history becomes a realizing process of a prior existing future which is already determined and complete, as complete and
perfect as the essence of the deity.

This future breaks in upon the

present and realizes itself in part.

At the end of history the reali-

zation process will be finished.

The com=i:ng to pass of the rule of God,

the form of which is predetermined and was revealed through the teachings of Jesus, will be complete.

,J

Moltmann's critique of Pannenberg's

11

eschatological 11 world view is

part of his more "general critique of the epiphany religions, namely, 11

I
I

•'

This situation is ironical because Pannenberg sets out with
the proposition that "history is what happens between promise
and fulfillment." But he abandons the word of promise in favor
of events of promise and fulfillment as the bearers of revelation, therefore he retains the Greek cosmic theology in principle, though making it eschatological from the standpoint of
present epistemology.51
In other words, Holtmann rejects any and all attempts to objectify the

God of the promise, (except in the sense of the German pun cited above).
If he is unwilling to accept a theology based upon the manifestation of

5®~., p. 56.
51Moltmann, pp. 78-79.
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the "eternal present," then he cannot be willing to accept a theology
based upon a progressive realization of the eternal future.
'I'he consequences of Pannenberg's position for hermeneutics here
criticized by Holtmann would be to view Jesus as a future-existing
prophet who made an appearance in time.
event.

His death was an historical

His resurrection was an event of the future, connected with

uesus' death in time only through His person.

These events gave authen-

ticity to Jesus' message of the kingdom, a message which differed from
the Jewish eschatological hope only in that

11

Jesus underscored the pres-

ent impact of the imminent future. 11 52 This view upholds the finality of
God's self-revelation through Jesus of Nazareth testified to in the
Bible, but it does so at the expense of the word of promise.

According

to Pannenberg's view God does not make promises through Jesus, He announces future facts.

The rest of the Old and New Testament message

has ever-diminishing significance as the possibility of the hearer's
reacting to the historical Jesus becomes more and more a possibility of
reacting to an account rather than a person.
is not without merit.

The idea of future facts

Moltmann agrees that God promises a specific fu-

ture to man, just as He promised a specific future to the patriarchs.
But according to Moltrnann, God's promise sets active hope in motion to
claim the fulfillment.

For Pannenberg the promise merely announces the

inevitable and presents an ethical decision to be made in the light of
the inevitable.
Moltmann wants to keep Pannenl,erg's certainty about a specific
future, based on a promise that "binds man to the future and gives him

52Pannenberg, p. 53.
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a sense for history. 11 53 He also wants to keep the progressive view of
promise as a "horizon of expectation, 11 directed into the future and
moving along with universal history which "invites us to press futher
ahead. 11 54 And most of all, ti.ioltmann agrees with Pannenberg, and thereby
disagrees with Positivism, that because the present is an effect of the
future, "reality as a whole" is therefore "historically open and provisional in view of that end of history in which the wholeness of
reality will come to light. n55
Moltmann's Theology of Hope as an answer to Barr's conce rns
The last section of this chapter will be devoted to the whole
problem of "revelation through history" as it was presented by James
Barr in his inaugural address at Princeton Theological ~eminary, and as
it was reprinted by i'larty and Peerman in New 'l'heolog.y.

The following

is a relevant portion of Barr's address:
'l'o say this does not mean that we are trying to get rid of the
idea of revelation through history. This idea is, I believe, a
fair expression of a really important element in the Bible;
there really is a Heilsgeschichte, a series of events set within
the plane of human life and in historical sequence, through
which God has revealed himself. I would not doubt that we have
been generally right in saying that this can be taken as the
central theme of the Bible, that it forms the main link between
Old and New Testaments, and that its presence and importance
clearly marks Biblical faith off from other religions. I do
feel, however, that there are other axes through the Biblical
material which are equally pervasive and important, although
they may not be so comforting apologeti cally.

53Moltmann, p. 103.

54 Ibid., p. 125.

55rbict., pp. 276-277.

And I also feel that our apologetic situation in relation to
the world outside of theology is changing, so that the value
of an orientation to history may alter.5 6
Moltmann agrees and suggests an answer.
Bible is eschatology.

His "other axis" through the

The response to eschatology is hope.

And the

link between the eschatological asix through the Bible and the salvationhistorical "biblical faith" is the horizon of expectation concept.
If Barr was correct in saying that revelation through history was a
response to the apologetic needs of the Nineteenth Century57 when
"history" seemed to threaten Christianity , then the modern interpreter
has to start looking for that other axis through the Bible which best
suits Twentieth Century apologetics.

For Holtmann, his understanding of

the theology of hope constitutes such an axis.

Moltmann applies the

apologetics of hope as follows:
To think God and history together on the ground of the event of
the promise in the resurrection of Christ does not mean to prove
God from the world or from history, but vice-versa to show the
world to be history that is open to God and to the future.
Christian theology will thus not be able to come to tenns with,
but will have to free itself from, the cosmologico-mechanistic
way of thinking such as is found in the positivistic sciences whether in the scientific disenchanting of the world, by which
the world not only becomes 11 godless, 11 as Max Weber has said,
but also becomes without alternatives, without possibilities and
without any future, as in the factualized and institutionalized
relationships of the scientific civilization of modern society,
which in the same way is threatened with the loss not only of
its future but of its own historic character as well. Theology
will be able to free itself, ho~ever, only by breaking up this

56page 6,.
57Ibid., pp. 62-63.
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kind of thinking and these relationships and striving tb set
them in the eschatological movement of history.58
1''or Moltmann, therefore, eschatology is the measure of all things.
It is the only valid interpretation that turns events (Geschehen) into
Geschichte.

Another reviewer of Moltmann's work, Herbert Dymale, comes

to the same conclusion:
If hope was the key to what motivated Old Testament people,
then it should be the key to our motivation. Theology based
on hope is free from all kinds of world views and utopian
schemes, for now world history .can be experienced in the
light of the future of truth.,,
The key to hermeneutics, then, is not so much the r evelation of truth
through historical events, but it is the opening up of history through
eschatology.

In the words of r'1oltmann hi mself:

It is neither that history s,·1allows up eschatology (Albert
Schweitzer) nor does eschatology swallow up history (Rudolf
Bultmann). The logos of the eschat'6n is promise of that
which is not yet, and for that reason it makes history.
The promise which announces the eschaton, and in the eschaton
announces itself, is the motive power, th&,mainspring, the
driving force and the torture of history. · ·
So we have seen how Moltmann works with the exegetical data
derived from the Bible according to the methods described in Chap~er
III.

The chief datum is eschatology; that is, the presenta tion of a

promise and an invitation to hope.

'l he occurrence of fulfilment events

expands the horizon of the promise, alters reality (Wirklichkeit)
[which can also mean the dialectical "synthesis"] , and focuses attention on the antithetical "overspill" t hat challenges even the new

58Moltmann, p. ~3.
5,Herbert Dymale, "What Kind of Hope is Adequate? " Christianity
Today, XV (June 18, 1,71), 9-10 (877-878).

60Moltmann, p. 16 5.
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reality.

The final operation of systematic theology is to apply the

biblical message to contemporary questions in terms of "dialogue" with
the philosophy of the age.
Moltmann's polemics against positivism are very effective.

He

describes it as a phenomenon of the past--the ultimate place of reprobation.

His apologetics are in terms of irnst Bloch's revisionist

Marxism, a system that takes the idea of eschatology seriously.

As a

result, Moltmann's gospel is primarily a humanistic gospel {:certainly
not Moltmann's term, but definitely Bloch 1 i}, presented in more or
less traditional language.

Yet if our only knowledge of Moltmann de-

pended on Theology of Hope, we could hardly conclude that he is nothing
more than a revisionist Marxist like Bloch.
is too ambiguous .
move any doubt.

The language in this book

As we shall see, some of his shorter articles re-

CHAPTER V
HERM.EN'.1WTICAL PRINCIPLES IN
i'10LTMANN 1 S LESSER WORKS
This chapter, unlike the main section of this study, does not
examine Theology of Hope, but seeks instead to find important statements from Jurgen Moltmann in some of his articles.

As in the main

section, however, the chief concern is with hermeneutics.
it deals with the use Moltmann makes of history.

In particular

Some of the questions

raised in Chapters III an IV appear again: whether Moltmann uses the
principle of analogy as historians do, whether history is as important
to Moltmann as he claims or whether it is really swallowed up by eschatology, whether Moltmann uses words the same way consistently.
In Chapter IV above it was noted that Moltmann was much more sure
of what he meant by "eschatology" than the Old Testament professors
Gerhard von Rad and Walther Zimmerli.

In an essay entitled

11

'l'he Future

as Threat and Opportunity 111 one finds a precise definition of "eschatology"
in Holtmann I s own words: "a belief that takes the initiative towa rd transforming the world by means of the possibilities of the present. 112 This is
entirely consistent with the conclusion reached at the end of section

1 .•

Jurgen Moltmann, "The Future as Threat and as Opportunity, 11
translated by Shierry Weber, The Reli~ious Situation, edited by Donald
R. Cutler (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969 p. ~25.
2 Ibid.
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2 in Chapter IV above; namely, that 1-bltmann saw himself as the contemporary
counterpart to the Apocalypticist whose theological traditions were inadequate to minister to his hope because the horizon of expectation had
moved on.

Hope must have promises to survive, and t~ltmann has found in

the Scriptures the promise of a transformed world, a promise that has
been neglected by the prevailing voices in theology.

One might ask whether

Moltmann is qualifying his hope for the future unnecessarily by stating
that the transformation is to be accomplished
of the present."

11

by means of the possibilities

Moltmann makes it very clear that he is not merely

practicing trend analysis.

He is not extrapolating the future from the

present, but anticipating it.

As for the initiative toward the transforma-

tion, Moltmann claims that Christian faith "mediates in practice" between
the anticipated future and the possibilities of the present.3
t-k>ltmann goes so far as to equate
because the object of faith is the

11

11

faith 11 and

11

hope. 11

That is

God in front of us, 11 and the object

of hope is "his kingdom" made recognizable in the world.

There is no

God without the kingdom and no kingdom without God.4 This transformation
of the world is a divine act in the same way that the exodus of Israel
and the resurrection of Jesus were divine acts.5 W
hereas in Theology of
Hope .Moltmann's ethics called for a contradiction of the donditions of
the present, in "The Future as Threat and Opportunity" they go beyond

)Ibid., p.

n6.

4 Ibid., pp. ,24-~25.
5Ibid.

-
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any passive, negative, patient waiting to an active initiative involved
in transforming.

This activity is probably also Moltmann's intention

in Theology of Hope but it is never .as clearly stated there as it is
in the short article.
If the concepts of "faith" and "hope" have been equated in "The
Future as Threat and Opportunity" they are distinguished in "The Realism
of Hope. 116 Faith, according to r-foltmann, is abundantly present in the
church of today, whereas hope, coupled with hunger for freedom, is lacking.? Faith here signifies the ability to comprehend and to interpret
the Gospel message.

There is no want of biblical interpreters in our

church, but hope demands that the church go beyond interpretation.
It involves the church with the "God in front of us," and makes the
church restless for the kingdom.

In this article, and in Theology of

Hope, Moltmann uses the word "faith" to denote the quiet, passive side
of the Christian life.

It is almost an intellectual when the context is a

discussion of Rudolf Bultmann's theology.

"Hope" on the other hand, is

the dynamic, active dimension of the Christian life, the outward-looking,
world-confronting, future-grasping dimension.

Consider this statement:

Yet faith also underwent a change as this hope that the
future was coming • • • was lost in the quicksands of
history • • • • All that Faster meant was: there is a life
after death. 8

8 Full title: "The Realism of Hope: The Feast of the Resurrection
and the Transformation of the Present Rea lity," translated by Gilbert
A. Thiele, Concordia Theological Monthly XL (March 1969), 14,-155.
7
.
Ibid., XL, 14,.
8 Ibid., XL, 1 50.
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In l'bltmann's judgment, the church relinquished its social eschatology
for an individual eschatology.

The concern for the world was there all

along, but the optimism, according to Moltmann, disappeared.

It would

have been appreciated a great amount of supportive evidence, especially
from the medieval period, for i'loltmann's statement.
vain.

One seeks it in

But the intention here is not to evaluate Moltmann's historical

judgment.

The significance for Moltmann's hermeneut:!,.cs is this: social

eschatology is the key cater,ory, the main axis through the Scriptures,
around which all of the Biblical teachings are mustered and classified.
One ought to expect, therefore, a polemical attitude toward the church
which, according to Moltmann, has substituted an individualized for
the original social eschatology.
In fact, Moltmann goes beyond polemics to a specific program as
outlined in "Toward a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel. n'J
One must be able to apply the biblical horizon of concern
between the Chris~ event and the coming of the kingdom to
the corresponding present horizon of concern between freedom and oppression.
From this vantage point, then, textual exegesis is no longer
only .a peculiar concern for self-understanding which will
occasionally conform with comprehension. It is more a matter of special understanding of the text's concern which
strives for practical congruence between the biblical tradition's horizon of concern and present circumstances. It
also perceives the needs and the opportunities of present
social reality. 10

'J~rgen Moltmann, "Toward a Politi.cal Hermeneutic of the Gospel,"
Union ~eminary Quarterly Review, XXIII , no. 4 (1968), 303-323.
1

Olbid., XXIII, 314.

The content of the specific program is "political henneneutics, 11
the application of the biblical message to "present social reality"
in terms of the political "opportunities."

The pattern for political

hope is "the biblica l tradition's horizon of concern," which it is the
function of the modern interpreter to divest of mythology and other
hinderances to immediate social applicability.

The church then, is to

make political decisions which it believes will bring political reality
closer to "practical congruence" with the pattern for political hope.
In Chapter IV above, the point was made that Theology of !lope left
the role of myth in hermeneutics unclear.

In "Toward a Political Hermen-

eutic of the Gospel" Holtmann does not wait for his disciples to answer
the question, but affirms that history is the absolute setting for all
hope, and that political action is the only sacrament.

~very transcen-

dental element has been removed except "the future," which someday will
be immanent but for the present is, at least conceptually, transcendent.
The ground for demythologization is not one's world-view, but the cross
of Jesus Christ. 11 Now Holtmann does not demythologize the crucifixion.
But this historical fact of the cross of Jesus Christ is applied by the
Biblical interpreter as the "expression of real human affliction, 1112
the problem, or "need" of present social reality corresponds to it.

The

resurrection is "the protest" against affliction.13 It also has a con-

11
12

Ibid., XXIII, 313.
Ibid., XXIII, 314.

13rbid.
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temporary counterpart, namely, the church's political activity in striving for social change.

So

M:>ltmann can say,

Consequently, the missionary proclamation of the cross of the
Resurrected One is not an opium of the people which intoxicates
and incapacitates, but the ferment of new freedom. 14
This "ferment" is an "effort to realize" the content of social
eschatology.

It is an optimistic ferment, because it believes that

one day history will be the kingdom of God.
Moltmann's specific program is also a Marxist program.
no doubt about this.

There is

Christian hope cannot be content with a social-

eschatological interpretation (Bonhoeffer) nor a rationalistic enlightenment (Feuerbach), but must strive for a historical realization of the
Christian religion as outlined by Marx. 15
What light do Moltmann's short writings shed upon his Theology of
Hope?

Aside from giving us many more examples of his use of the cate-

gory of history and the principle of analogy, they give us a clear definition of eschatology as Moltmann understands it.
derstand his use of the terms

II

faith II and

11

They help us to un-

hope, 11 and they spell out,

in a way Theology of Hope does not, Moltmann's completely immanent,
historical setting for the biblical message and for the kingdom of God.

l4Ibid.
l5Ibid., XXIII, 312.

CHAPTER VI
CRITIQUE OF THEOLOOY OF HOPE
Moltmann and the Orthodox Christian Church
,•

This chapter is an attempt to evaluate Jurgen Holtmann's Theology
of Hope, particularly his hermeneutics and the view of history that lies
at the bottom of his hermeneutics.

Moltmann's relationship to historical

Christianity is discussed first because the prospective assumed by the
author is dravm from his commitment to Christianity, particularly
Christian orthodoxy.

This includes the conviction that theology should

be evaluated with regard to its claims of service to the church.
Moltmann does not claim to be orthodox.

But as part of the pre-

lude to his labor, he is constantly calling the reader's attention to
the history of the church and all of it conflicts.

Moltmann definitely

conceives of his theology as a contribution to the main stream of
ecclesiastical thought.

The following attempt to contrast the ortho-

dox Christian faith with Moltmann's theology of hope is arra nged around
three focal questions: the concept of revelation through history, the
path of theological knowledge, and the hermeneutical center of the
Scriptures.
Revelation through history: universal or particular?
The most frequent context in which the theme of revelation through
history is discussed today is the nee-orthodox contention that revelation

is an individual, subjective matter, quite independent of verifiable
data, and the counter-claim that revelation takes place through God's
activity in universal history , in verifiable events.

This context is,

regrettably, independent of the discussion referred to in Chapter II
1
above, namely the work of R.R. Niebuhr regarding historical knowledge
as such.
dox view.

In Theology of Hope Holtmann contends against the neo-orthoAs was demonstrated above, he refuses to accept the subject-

object complex which cut theology off from investigation.

But when

Holtmann made his decision to stand on history, since he lacked any
modern scientific investigation of the historical events upon which the
Christian faith is grounded, he accepted the claim of Albert Schweitzer
that the events are not verifiable.

It is true that he did not accept

this without a great deal of complaining, and, perhaps in agreement
with James Barr, he has found another important 1!axis 11 through the
Scriptures, namely, eschatology.

Moltmann claims that while for

Schweitzer history "swallows up eschatology," he gives eschatology its
due by making it the driving force of history in the Hegelian sense.
But such a claim is not verifiable (except from the!_ posteriori viewpoint of one standing at the end of history).

No scientific investi-

gation of history has to this date proved that eschatology is its
driving force.
Moreover, as Moltmanr. develops his Theology of Hope it becomes
apparent that the "universa l history" he is talking about is limited

lfiichard Ii. Niebuhr, Hesurrection and Historical h'. eason ( New
York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1~57).

to the ~·ies tern \-.•or ld, and furthermore to the Kantian era.
history is a Kantian view, much like ~khwei tzer' s.

His view of

And the practical

application of his theology is his "eschatologica l" ethics, his "exodus
church," which is a whole community of Albert ~chweitzers, or a regiment of people like francis of Assisi.
The orthodox Christian faith, by contrast, does not speak of
revelation in universal history, nor in subjectivity, but in the actual
events of the history of a particular people, their prophetic and
apostolic interpretation.

The orthodox Christian begins with divine

revelation and then addresses it to history.

This attitude is des- ·

cribed by Eric Rust as follows:
In the Heorew-Christian tradition the emphasis falls, not on
human reason, but on divine revelation. This tradition points
to a particular series of events unified around a supreme event,
Jesus Christ, his life, death, and resurrection. It regards
these events as the medium of divine self-disclosure. The
basic promise is that the ultimate truth is not universally
available, waiting everywhere to be discovered and unveiled by
human reason, as the Greek tradition supposed, but that it is
bound up with a particular history. God has been pleased
to show himself redernptively, to manifest his true nature, in
a special stream of historical events in which he has acted
with power and great glory to deliver men.2
It has been argued that there is no scientific verification for
the theory that God has revealed Himself to man if the particular
history of the Hebrews culminating in Jesus of Nazareth.
reply that there is no evidence to the contrary.

Cne might

'!'his leads to the

conclusion that theological knowledge has not yet become verifiable
in a scientific way•

Although it is commonly held that certain theo-

logical postulates (for e:xa 1
.
.
.
mp e, llll.racles) have been disproved by the
2

Eric Rust. Towards a Theolo . .
..
York: Oxford University p
1.cal l.Jnderstana1.n
ress, 1963 , p. 61 •

of His tor

(New

,1
discovery of repeated and predictible patte~s (interesLingly referred
to as "laws") of nature, this common uelief is limited to an empirical
methodology which cannot investigate the past, and can make historical
judgments only by supposing that natural conditions have always been
very similar.

The orthodox Christian would not a e ree with that position

without some evangelical qualification.
The path of theological knowledge
Moltmann was quoted above in Chapter III to the effect that
theological knowledge always begins with the concrete, particular historical data and moves toward the universal and eschatological.

::io he

began by investi ga ting the concrete, particular history of Jesus of
Nazareth, the Jewish setting, the influence of the Uld Testament on
the thoughts of Jesus and the Apostles, the interpretation of the
resurrection according to the promises in the Old Testament, the traditions of that Apocalyptic movement which began during the Antiochene
persecution and persisted into the earliest church.

..

~ext he analyzes

these data according to the discipline of liberlieferungsgeschichte, a
very thoroughgoing process in which the content of the traditions is
used as a curb to channel the thoughts one nught have about the resurrection as an event into directions consistent with the Apocalyptic
interpretations of the relationship between God and the world.

Molt-

mann observed how the Apocalypticist theologized by building on the
prophetic tradition, then he turned his attention to the disciples and
how they theologized, applying Apocaly ptic traditions to the resurrection.

finally, Moltmann did what he believed the Apocalyptic

1.-:ri ters were doing mutatis mutandis; he t heologized by applying neoorthodox exegetical studies to his new "horizon" of hope.
One promise that underlies r4oltmann' s Uberlieferungsgeschichte
is that no one event completely satisfies a di vine promise.
always an "overspill."

There is

In English translat i on the word "overspill"

just hangs, unrelated to the conc ept of "tra dition."

In Gerrnan,

however, roltmann is playing with the word, and this complica tes his
theology rather than clarifying it.

Moltmann is never ~uite clear

about his ov.n concept of tradition.

If Moltmann is talking Pannen-

bergian language, and

..Uberlieferungsgechichte means

the ,iclassification

of overspills," one divine promise always leading to anothe r, (an interpretation which is certainly possible on the basis of 'lheology of
Hope), then only the final generation will know what God's promises
and covenant are really all about.

All t he rest of mankind is

putting a puzzle together, handicapped by so many missing pieces, although later generations had more of t he pieces than earlier gener-

..

ations.

On the other hand, Uberlieferungsgeschichte might mean the

study of

'fT",r'~ 6ouc 1

, or what has been called "history of the trans-

mission of traditions."

.1.f the latter is true, then revela tion is an

event experienced by the ancient ones and preserved by subsequent
generations, ~ith the original content getting more and more obscure
with the passage of time, and complicated by the rise of new traditions.
In Theolog.y of Hope, the former interpretation, "classification
of overspills" seems to predominate.

In orthodox Christian theology on the other hand, "tradition"
/

always means

11';{JJ..JOl<I.

God may have given out limited fragments

of revelation in the Old Testament, (Hebr. 1 :1), out in the New He has
revealed His kingdom, His plans for the future, and His will for His
people by "speaking to us through a Son," who is "the image of the
invisible God, the firstborn of creation," who "was put to death for
our offenses and raised again for our justification."

The apostolic

generation was the final generation in which revelation occurs.

'I'heolo-

gizing takes on a new character after the passing of the apostolic age:
no longer is the bearer of the word concerned so much with interpreting,
finding meaning for himself, as he is with witnessing, sharing absolute
meaning with others.

The form of the witness evolves from one generation

to the next because the secular history and consequently the "vernacular"
language is never stable.

but the content is still the apostolic

faith, the "faith once delivered unto the saints."

There is a quali-

tative difference between synthesizing a theology from incomplete,
elementary revelations, and finding new ways of confessing the one
holy faith.

This is the contrast between Theology of Hope, insofar as

it is Pannenbergian, and the orthodox Christian theology.
The hermeneutical center of Scripture
Ever since the close of the apostolic age the church has been
engag ed in theological conflicts in which both parties have appealed
to the authority of the lJible.

Very early in the church's hisc.ory

the canon of :,jcripture wa s established.

This narrowed the scope of

,4
the conflict to some extent but did not diminish the intensity of it.
The establishment of the magisteriwn served to preserve order in the
church as a whole; it determined what was orthodox as far as public
teaching goes, but private opinion cannot be regulated, and the magisterium itself was made up of people whose opinions differed.

Two

ecclesiastical teachers could appeal to the sarne Scripture to support
contrary doctrines, as indeed Jesus and the Pharisees came up with
different interpretations for the Old Testament.

The Ecumenical Creeds

may have been hailed as a rule of faith, but they set out to confess
the chief articles of belief, not to provide a henneneutical principle
for the canon.

For instance, one might agree with all of the articles

of the creed and yet have a position on soteriology which is contrary
to John's or Luke's or Paul's.
For Moltma.nn the hermeneutical center of the Scripture is
eschatology, the expectation of the future and the effect of that
expect·a tion on the present.

Whether Moltmann is talking about Abraham,

the Exodus, the Prophets, or the Corinthians, he is chiefly interested
in what they expected and how that anticipation changed their lives.
Thus the message of the church today consists of a call to anticipate
the kingdom of God and, correspondingly, to embark upon the journey
of conquest.
This does not mean that Moltmann overlooks the cross of Jesus.
On the contrary, Holtmann insists upon what he calls the eschato-

logia crucis.

If anticipation of the kingdom is the chief objective

of the kerygma, the memory of the cross is the medium of the message.
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Thus, applied to hermeneutics, if the anticipation of the kingdom is
the center of the promise, the memory of the cross and resurrection
constitutes the center of the proclamation of its fulfilment.

Not only

is the cross inseparable from the resurrection; neither can dominate
nor obscure the other.

They constitute one event.

The counterpart of

that event is the hopeful striving, the expectant conflict of the
"exodus church," which is the contempora ry disci ples of the crucified,
risen, and coming Jesus.
For the orthodox Christian church, "eschatology" has always had
a transcendent meaning.

~ome of this may be due to what r,Joltmann

calls iiellenization, but this contention cannot be proved because when
one reads the Apocalyptic writings one finds the same transcendental
note.

In systematic theology, "eschatology" refers to the teachings
/

concerning death, life after death, the
judgment.

11rJf<N ~<.J.

, and the last

Various sects have insisted on including the millenium as a

legitimate biblical eschatological doctrine, but the orthodox church
as a whole has taken a negative position on chiliasm (for example,
Confession, XVII).
The term "kingdom of God" was at one time identified with the
orthodox church as the leadership of a Christian society, or else with
"Christendom," society itself.

But it was not long before church and

society came into conflict with one another, and the church came to
view Christendom as a mixed blessing, while it thought of itself as
the spiritual empire co-existing with the human city and in dialogue
with it.

There followed a period of intense conflict between the
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church and the Christian society, marked by various attempts to define
civil and ecclesiastical preprogatives until the age of Innocent III,
when the church emerged as the de facto £eudal suzerain over the state.
That was a delicate balance which was 1ost as soon as the church tried
to claim legal suzerainty as well.

The structure of the spiritual

empire crumbled, its institutions were discredited, the identification
of the church Hith the kingdom of God was over.

A reaction set in

depicting the church as nothing more than a secular organization,
while the "kingdom of God" passed from the realm of the rea li:Gable in
history to the theoretical structures of the theologians.
an ideal to be realized.

It became

And the ma. j ori ty opinion of the theologians

who had not been completely secularized was that the realization of the
kingdom required some kind of return to the conditions of the
thirteenth century.
For Luther the kingdom was not an ideal, but an evangelical
reality.3 Luther could speak of "three kingdoms, 11 the first being the
structure of God's Providential rule over the creation, the second
being the church, not the institutional church but the hidden (abscondita)
church, and the third being the transcendent eschatological estate of
the blessed.

In an important way these were really only one kingdom,

for all were under the same King and His ultimate purposes were the
same even though the structures through which He realized these purposes differed.

3werne r b.le rt, 1'he Stru t
,
H
n ( St. Louis: Conco d" \ure_of Luthera~ translated by ,Jalter
anse
r ia ubhshing Haus~, 1962), pp. 258-261.
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The Reformed position held that the "kingdom of grace," through
which the pilgrim progressed, was a visible, institutional entity
which the church was obliged to realize in hi story.

As a result of

this difference, one might too quickly conclude that Moltrnann's eschatology, with its completely visible church, would be more at home with
the Reformed than with Luther.

Ultimately this may be the case, but

historically, the Reformed tendency ha s been to identify God's providential blessing with His eschatological approval, a doctrine which
i'1oltmann with his eschatologia crucis would repudiate .
In his own historico-eschatological jargon Moltmann affirms the
grace of God toward man, and he places the locus of this grace in the
sense of promise, at the hermeneutical center.

The questions he then

brings to the Scriptures are not the traditional ones.

Holtmann asks

where the God of promise has revealed His fait hfulness, and he finds
this primarily in the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus, though
the prior revelations to Israel are important to point out God's consistency as well as rlis radical freedom to adopt new ways .

Along with

the promise Holtmann finds the demand for parapatetic discipleship,
but also anticipant discipleship.

This demand gathers together an

eschatological conununity which hopes for the kingdom of God under the
conditions of the world, and moves toward the horizon beyond which it
knows the future will dawn, bringing with it the new conditions of the
kingdom of God.
How can the orthodox church evalua Le i•lol tmann 1 s 'lheology of Hope?
There are two items which are incompatible with orthodox doctrine .

The
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first is the closed unive rse; the other, Moltmann's unfortunate mixture
of Law and Gospel, which prevents his church from existing in and cooperating with ar.~, given historical society.

As to the former, Molt-

mann may be able to produce a substantial polemic against positivistic
historicism, but he is able to apply it only to the future.
is still sealed up within a closed , Kantian system.

The past

Tha t system rejects

!!. priori those miracles in which God revea led His grace.

The second

incompatibility consists in the way tfoltmann describes promis e, that is,
as primarily agenda.

To achieve blessedness, who receives the promise

will accept and fulfill that agenda.

I n orthodox theology one must first

be blessed in order to undertake the agenda.

'l'hese faults a re the more

unfortunate because 1'loltmann knows the Scripture as well, and because
he sympathizes with the Christian Church.

Uut we must clas sify him as

a heterodox writer and theologian the writer of a theology which the
church cannot accept as orthodox.
1-bltmann and Modern Historical Epistemology
The previous section compared Moltmann's eschatology and
henneneutics with their classical orthodox counterparts.

The follow-

ing section is concerned with the study of history in our. time and
with how Moltmann 1 s theology of hope "takes history seriously. 11

As

this subject is presented the reader is asked to remember once again
i•loltrnann's claim that, ,vhile for Schweitzer, while history swallows up
eschatology, for ::ichweitzer and for i.lultmann, eschatology swallows up
history, the new historico-eschatological school does j ustice to both.

''
Since so much of r4oltmann 's historical study has IJeen devoted to
the Bible, and since, as was noted in (;hapter II above, there was an
impasse between historical reason and the knowledge of faith, the matter
of historical epistemology seems to be the critical point.

The author

has made use of h. G. (;ollingwood's work, The Idea of History, as representative of the best of modern, post-Positivistic, yet non-theological
treatments of historica l epistemology.

Certain theologians, na~ely

Knox, Thielecke, and Pannenberg, whom r-ioltmann either quotes or refers
to, have also been brought together beside Theology of Hope for purposes of comparison.
what is an event?
Every historician speaks of events.
history.

Events are the matter of

And events are important for 1•: 0ltmann, too; for his escha-

tology is grounded in events.
or perhaps in facts?

Does that mean hope is grounded in fact,

Moltmann is able to speak rather comfortably

about the fact of the crucifixion, but prefers the term "event" which
includes occurrence and interpretation when speaking of the resurrection, although sometimes it is evident from the context (for example,
"mere event") that this distinction is far from consistent.

It is not

clear, then, whether when Moltmann speaks of the resurrection as an
event he means it as something less than fact or something more than
fact.
John Knox distinguishes a "fact" from an "event." The latter
is the basic category for an analysis of history and the way
in which it is known. One cannot speak of an historical subject.
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From this it follows that one cannot point to Jesus without
indicating the Christian conununity, which is the response
that constitutes a part of the "Christ-event." Under this
procedure, the New Testament does not stand outside of the
church as an objective kerygma, but appears in its true
identity as a concretion of the earliest portion of the
community's memory, representing the living continuity of
the present church with its origins. Jesus Christ, church,
and New Testament are viewed as an internally related triad
after the analogy of the kno m, the knower, and the knower's
interpretation of the known.

4

Now Knox is using "subject" and "object" language here which
Moltmann will not accept, nevertheless, if the New Testament is an
"interpretation of the known," and Jesus is "the known," then the
"event," the "triad," is not the same thing as the fact.

The event

is greater than the fact because the fact alone is not part of hwnan
consciousness as the event is.
Compare this with Collingwood's analysis of the "inside of the
event."
When a scientist asks why a piece of litmus paper turns pink
he means to ask the occasions on which pieces of litmus ' paper?··
turned pink. When the historian asks why Brutus stabbed
Caesar, he means to ask what Brutus thought that made him
decide to stab Caesar. The cause of the event, for him,
means the thought in the mind of the person by whose agency
the event came aQout: and this is not something other than
the event, it is the inside of the event itself.5
By this standard, is the church the "agent" by which the kerygma

came about?

Is the "thought" of the historical Jesus that "made him

decide" to go to the cross the real "inside of the event" upon which
eschatology depends?

Moltmann does not see the question as being this

4
Richard R. Niebuhr, Resurrection and Historical Reason (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 62-63 •
5R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Hit
(Oxford: Clarendon Press,
194~), PP• 214-21 5 • 'I'his work is baseds o~r;
series
of lectures written in 1936.
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clear-cut.

The church and Jesus are both agents of history, but also

products of it.

Their thoughts are not so much the "inside" of events

as they are the creatures of the historical situation, particularly the
"horizon of expectation."
Suspension and tension
Moltmann is essentially in agreement with Collingwood, only
instead of "thought" produced by an "agent," Moltmann finds as the
true inside of the event eschatology, the promise-oriented aspect of
the event, which is a product of "the future" as seen from the historical subject's horizon of expectation.

Collingwood says,

By the outside of the event I mean everything belonging to it
which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements •
• • • By the inside of the event I mean that in it which can
only be described in terms of thought • • • • -The historian is
never concerned with either of these to the exclusion of the
other. He is investigating not mere events (where by a mere
event I mean one which has only an outside and no inside) but
actions, and an action is the unity of the outside and inside
of an event. 6
Collingwood see~ the future as a product of the present.
mann sees the reverse.

Molt-

But substitute the term "horizon of expecta-

tion" for the tenn "thought" in the passage just quoted from Collingwood.
See that the meaning is hardly changed.

For both Xoltmann and Colling-

wood the content of history is tension, tension between the historical
subject and his expectations.

Because· Collingwood sees the future as

a product of the present, he would say that historical events are attempts to change or create expectations.
He says,

'Ibid., p. 213.

I4oltmann would disagree.

•
1@2

If events are experienced within the horizon of remembered and
expected promises, then are experienced as truly historic events~
They do not then have only the accidental, individual, and relative character which we normally ascribe to historic events,
but also have an unfinished and provisional character that points
ahead. Events experienced within the horizon of promise and hope
bear the mark of something still outstanding.?
They are "still outstanding" because the hope did not originate with
the historical subject.
future.

ivhat the subject di d have was a glimpse of the

Rather than creating expectations, events, viewed this way,

represent attempts to realize expectations.
The facts of history must be understood not as process complete in themselves but as stages on a road that goes further
and elements in a process that continues. Events experienced
this way must be passed on because in them something is seen
which is determinative for future generations. On the other
hand, they may be freely interpreted and actualized by each
new present, since they are never so firmly established that
we could rgstrict ourselves merely to ascertaining what they
once were.
Thus history, for Moltmann, is the science of this tension that
lies between the future which has been partially revealed and the
subject's historical situation.

Moltmann uses the word "suspension,"'

a term indicative of instability but also of freedom.
always between two poles.

Suspension is

The future is one pole, the other is the

remembered promise, a word from God that calls forth the future.
Reason and faith
The last question to be considered here under Holtmann and
historical epistemology has to do with the role of faith (or perhaps

7 Ju·rgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, translated by James
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 107-108.
8Ibid.

;v.

Leitch
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the role of hope) over against reason in the interpretation of historical events.

Moltmann, as was demonstrated in Chapter II above,

took care not to subject the secular reality, the Wirklichkeit with
which every historian works, to the faith-judgments of a small group of
people, lest theology become an obscurantist discipline.

To avoid this,

that is, to escape what has been called the second side of the impasse,
floltmann insists upon some kind of historical-critical hermeneutics
rather than existential, "kerygmatic" theology.
Moltmann here agrees with the position of Helmuth Thielicke,
who, in reaction to the neo-orthodox contention that the Gospel needs
no historical verification, claimed that more objectivity was needed
if the kerygma was to do its job. 10 According to Thielicke, there are at
least three good reasons for historical-critical examination:

(1) His-

torical reason may not be supressed, but must be redeemed as part of the
total man;

(2) The boundary between faith's uniqueness and other know-

ledge must be determined; and (3) Historical criticism must determine
whether or not its results contradict the content of the Easter kerygma,
with the stipulation that truth is indivisible, and therefore faith
cannot be grounded in a non-event.11 Holtmann would add, however, that
hope is really

11

grounded" in the event of the future, but that know-

ledge of the future depends upon the promises, which in turn revolve
around Jesus and his resurrection.

The resurrection, whatever it may

mean historically for l-bltmann, is certainly not · a non-event.

10 ttel.llut

It is an

Thielicke, 11 'l'he Resurrection Kerygma," The Easter Messa e
for Today, translated by ;jalvator Attanasio and Darrell Guder New York:
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1~64), P•

?,.

11 Ibid., pp. 79-84.
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"eschatologically new" event.

And the "exodus church" created by the

resurrection brings the redemption for human re;.i. son.

As for the unique-

ness of the .faith, i"ioltmann would say that other knowledge depends upon
empirical investigation whereas Christian Faith knows the reality of
its hope.

Hope cannot be ernpirically investigated in advance.

Dut,

because the God of the promise has revea~ed His faithfulness, therefore
He can and does lay His claim upon the reason.
Reason alone does not attribute historical events to the agency of
God.

Indeed, Collingwood denies that God is, properly speaking, an

historical subject, or even an historical object.

To Collingwood, the

Old Testament is not history at all; true history begins with Herodotus.
P~nnenberg has taken exception to Collingwood's claim saying that the
latter is only interested in methodology, in Historie and not Geschichte,
and that Herodotus, whom Collingwood (after the Western academic tradition) calls "the father of history, 11 was really only the father of
Historie, that is, of a methodology for ascertaining facts. 12 The facts,
however, are not Geschichte.

For that, a new understanding of history

is necessary. 13
Is God, then genuine subject matter for history?
by revelation t}}rough faith.

But the "revelation II and

God can be known
11

faith" that

Pannenberg, and after him t·loltmann, talk about are not special, particular, or even theological.

They are available in universal history, al-

though one must begin with particular events to gain knowledge of them.

12"Redemptive Event and History" in Essays on Old Testament Hermeneutics,
edited by Klau~ Westermarm (ltichmond: John Knox Press, 1966), p. 320.
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Here is an even greater difficulty: can a God who does not exist,
or at least does not yet exist, be known?
be in fact what He already is in theory?

If He is known, then will He
In Chapter IV the question

was begged as to whether God's being and rule were separable.
berg's contention is that they are not.

Pannen-

God's being depends upon His

rule. 14 Since God 1 s rule has not yet come, then, if Pannenberg is right,
God's being is still in the process of becoming.
have an object for its knowledge.

But reason must then

And if God still does not exist

then He cannot be the object of reason's knowledge.

Therefore no man

can say that he "knows God."
Moltmann, as was pointed out in Chapter IV, differed from
Pannenberg because of the latter's interest in events, which caused him
to lose track of the promises, leading him to "retain the Greek cosmic
theology in principle, though making it eschatological from the standpoint of present epistemology. 111 5 Moltmann does net retain the Greek
cosmic theology because he does not tie revelation to events.

Events

belong to the province of reason, like facts, while the promise that
interprets them, the "inside of the event," belongs to the province of
hope.

God's rule is not an event.

But His being, and therefore His

rule, can be known to the one who hopes for it.
For Moltmann there is an even more compelling reason for separating
God's being from His rule.

This is the eschatologia crucis, the contra-

diction of the cross from which God rules and yet does not rule.

14See Chap. IV, fn. 50.
,
15

Moltmann, p. 78.

The

10,

one who hopes knows the contradiction of the cross (in this sense the
cross is an event), and in it he knows God.

On the cross, God's being

is in contradiction to His rule, and there the matter would well rest
but for the resurrection which announces the union of God's being and
His rule for the future.
Is Eschatology an Adequate Hermeneutical Center?
This final section of the "Critique of Theology of Hope" builds
upon what was discussed earlier in this chapter.
of "a hermeneutical center" applies.

The same definition

Here it is the author's concern

to deal with a printed criticism of Moltmann, to question the consistency of using Bloch's atheistic eschatology as a philosophical point
of contact for Christian theology, and to make a personal evaluation
of Moltmann's position.
Dyma1e 1 s questionable criticism
Every book that presents a new way of interpreting the Bible,
Theology of Hope, is bound to have its critics.

One early criticism

that appeared in the popular press was Herbert Dymale's written from
an evangelical viewpoint in Christianity Today. 16 He accuses Moltmann
of by-passing the question of the historicity of the resurrection, of
interpreting the event without establishing it in fact and thereby
simply accepting the principle of analogy which was described above as
the first side of the "impasse."

It has been the position of this paper

that Moltmann does not treat history the way Ernst Troeltsch did; this

1 •Herbert Dymale,

11
What Kind of Hope is Adequate, 11 Christianity
Today, XV (June 18, 1~71 ), 9-lQ (877-878)0
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has been demonstrated with material from 'l'heolog,y of Hope.

Dymale does

not give Moltmann enough credit when he says the following:
Little is gained by side-stepping the issue of historicity.
As important as hope is, we dare not attach it to less than
the historic data of an empty tomb and eyewitnesses. Moltmann's refusal to take seriously the question of historicity
suggests an attempt to build a socio-ethical structure by
capitalizing on the ready-formed sympathies implicit in the
name CHRISTIAN sic .1·r
Is this a fair criticism?

Holtmann takes history far more

seriously than Dyrnale would appear to admit.

..

Moltmann's Uberlieferungsges-

chichte is a method of approaching data which even the Positivists
would admit as "historical."

However, Dymale issues an important

caveat when he points out that
Student activist groups at Tubingen have openly attacked
professors and denounced the New Testament, particularly
the death of Christ. Everything in the Bible that is not
in line with improving society or outright favolution is,
they have said, meaningless and irrelevant.
Moltmann himself says that our own understanding of history is
historically conditioned, therefore Dymale's insinuation that the activists influenced Theolog,y of Hope fits in even with Moltmann's own
This may explain why in Moltmann I s later works the theology

analysis.

of hope is allowed to dri~ in favor of a political gospel.

But in

'I'heology of Hope Moltma.nn definitely does not denounce the death of
Christ.

Without denying the truth contained in Dymale's reference to

the situation at ~bingen, his primary criticism fails to take into

17Ibid.
18Ibid.
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account Moltmann's methodological solution to the impasse of historical

..

understanding of the New Testament, namely, Uberlieferungsgeschichte.
The gospel according to Bloch--Moltma.nn's weakness
It appears to this writer that Moltmann's greatest weakness is not
with his historical methodology, but rather with his metaphysical
system that underlies his eschatological understanding of history.
This system is very difficult to pinpoint in Theo~ogy of Hope because
Moltmann does not describe it.

He works with it.

One cannot cite

metaphysical treaties in Holtmann, one cites practical conclusions
that follow from Moltmann' s use of Bloch I s principle of hope.

For

example
This is why all proclamation stands in eschatological tension •
• • • It is valid only to the extent that it is made valid.
It is true to the extent that it announces the future of the
truth. It communicates this .truth in such a way that we can
have it onlv by confidently waiting for it and wholeheartedly
seeking it.

1'

For both ~bltrnann and Bloch, hope binds the individual to a
specific program that he can find in his historical situation at the
point where his vision of the kingdom intersects the horizon of expectation.

This program is usually connected with an eschatological

community.

This limitation is not due to biblical exegesis, but to the

metaphysical system of Bloch, for whom there is no real gift in the
theological sense.

1,

Moltmann, p. 326.

The writings of Bloch make it clear that for him, a true child of
the Renaissance who has adopted the literary style as well as the
vleltanschauung of the optimistic, humanistic, universal man, Prometheus
is normative, Christ is merely a symbol of the same aspiration, and the
first Gospel is announced in Genesis 3, not by Yahweh-Elohim, but by
the snake.
But there is in us not only the dim Adam whose thirst to know
good and evil was indeed quenched by Jesus the Savior and
Aesculapius, the white, whitened, returned serpent of paradise.
Standing above Adam is the dim Lucifer, and for his longing
to be like God sic, for his truly divine parentage and
heritage, not even Jesus himself has brought a recurrence, a
clarifying justification, and the triumph of his essence that
would clarify God himself.20
Bloch credits early Christian Gnosticism for the identification of
salvation with what the church properly calls "the Fall."

The Ophites

and Naasenes, whose cultic names are derived from vocables meaning
"serpent," seized upon the concept of knowledge expressed in the temptation of Eve.21 Bloch presents two curious reasons for containing the
Christian Gospel in the assertion 11 eritis sicut deus":
1.

The close connection between that Gospel and his own
philosophy, 11 S is not yet P."

2.

The claim that this Gospel "needs no demythologization. 1122

This is not true atheism, as Bloch claims it is.

It is Humanism,

but Humanism of a more eschatological variety than either classical or

20Ernst Bloch, "Christ, or the Uncovered Countenance, 11 translated by
E. B. Ashton, Man on His Own (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970) p. 109.
21 see also Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Heligion (Boston: Beacon Press,
1~58), pp.

,2-,4.

22Ernst Bloch, "Religious Truth," translated by John Cumming, Man
on His Own, p. 115.
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Renaissance Humanism; indeed, it is anthropotheisrn.

But by the term

"anthropotheism" this writer does not wish to impose upon Bloch's metaphysics a false interpretation based on a static idea of what man is.
He only wishes to question the need to go to such lengths in philosophy
in order to make a theological truth seem more real to the modern
reader.

Indeed, this is only the beginning, Bloch goes on to posit

metempsychosis as a device through which the individual who works with
creative hope in the present can lay claim to some future blessedness.
~'ven Plato only spoke of metempsychosis in the last book of the

Republic, a section which he himself called a "myth," but such a
doctrine "needs no demythologization," according to Bloch.
Bloch's confession of atheism only confuses the matter.
predicates non-existence to God.

But if

basic tenet of atheism be understood?

11

Atheism

5 is not yet P, 11 how can the

Does Bloch mean that God does

not yet exist, or that God does not yet not exist?

Whichever way we

take Bloch's assertions, for Moltmann, a confessed theist, God is an
essential factor for the future.

And if He is the God of Jesus, then

He is holy, and His holiness contradicts any Humanism that may develop.
Moltmann has partly overcome this weakness by separating God's being
from His rule, and applying the formula
latter.

11

5 is not yet P" only to the

God is coming, for 1.Joltmann, God's kingdom is coming.

But

its "goal can be attained only by obediently follo,d.ng the promise. n23

23 Moltmann, p. 325.
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A personal evaluation
This writer is convinced tha t Holtmann has found a methodology of
historically-conscious biblical interpretation that avoids the impasse ·
of unders t a nding described in Cha pter II.

He has found a principle of

analogy that is not heteronomous to eschatology and yet is able to deal
with the facts of history, the methodology of focusing attention on the
traditions and on the situations that bounded the horizon of expectation
of those who tried to realize past promises.

But Moltmann has limited

his theology by presenting it strictly in terms of Bloch's humanistic
philosophy, a philosophy which, given the present horizon of expectation,
directs hope , commitment, and promise to man as he is now, and charges
him with the responsibility for realizing the pictures of perfection
which come to him in the biblical promises.

Specifically, for the

present generation, the Christian coaununity can identify its mission
with that of the revolutionaries.

One suspects that the dialectical-

materialist "kingdom" serves the same function in that coming state
which the doctrine of eternal life served in the capitalist state.
Moltmann's "exodus church" is a means to an end.

It corresponds

to Bloch's "church of the future" which seems to generate propaganda
for the socialist millenium while silencing criticism of the classless,
warless, hopeless society.

Both churches, as their authors have pre-

sented them, direct people to "creative problem solving."
Such a church would be no church at all in the evangelical sense
of that word.
tisement.

'lhe promise ceases to be a gift, and becomes an adver-

The hearer is not a beneficiary, but a consumer who is in-

vited to do business with the future before it gains monopoly over

-
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all men.

He becomes totally committed to the kingdom not because it

is free, but because it is so dear that it requires a lifetime to
ammortize the debt upon it.

This is a pointed and effective way of

preaching God's Law; it lays the burden of producing the eschaton upon
the conscience, then provides no po\~er.
Creative problem solving, theologically considered, is a demand
for love, for

1

,

tA1'"1f+,

, something which flesh and blood cannot give.

There is a place for the cross in 1·1oltrnann 's theology, but only as a
theological interpretation of the contradiction between the eschatological
community and the society.

One may speak of faith, but only as it works

itself out in service to the world.

This is a secularized form of fides

caritate formata, the Tridentine heresy.
Most of the system of Theology of Hope can be redeemed from its
weaknesses and become a useful expression of evangelical theology.

To

be so redeemed, it needs a concept of grace that does justice to the
biblical doctrine of God's concern for the individual's eschatological
e.xistence, and that manife8ted itself in the atoning death of Jesus and
the miracle of his resurrection.
must not be demythologized.

This miracle, and indeed all miracles,

This is a difficult thing to say, but

miracles are not offensive because of human knowledge; they are offensive
because they call nomological existence as such into question, and man
/

depends upon \IOµ.OS

in all of its forms to justify his existence.

miracle expresses a holy will outside of man's control, and when men
see it, as in the case of the Galileans, "fear seizes them all."

,•ian

A

11 J

cannot manipulate the universe by. learning its
he can attain righteousness from the moral

/
VOJ.O~

/
vo,,_o.,

any more than
;

On the contrary,

"There is forgiveness with Thee, that 'l'hou mayest be feared" (Psalm
Once a man surrenders to the Forgiver, then he can say with

1JQ),

confidence,

11

I wait for the Lord • • • and in His ;1ord I hope. 11

There is much more that could be said about Theology of Hope.
However, this critique is concerned only with assigning a label to
Moltmann's system which will identify its place in current theology,
and to give reasons for the label chosen.

1he writer regrets that so

many words were required for purposes of clarification with a view to
dealing ·,,i th as much af Moltmann I s material as possible.
The point of departure for this critique was the relationship
between Moltmann and the historical orthodo:xy.

So a swnmary conclusion

regarding that relationship, heretofore denied the reader, is to be
expected.

~10ltma.nn does not stand in the orthodox Christian tradition.

But he writes in such a way that he seems to be sympathetic with it.
In reality he rejects it.

for all of Holtrnann's polemics against posi-

tivism, he cannot escape that label himself, for he is committed to
Kantian epistemology.

He is different from Schweitzer in that he intro-

duces the expectation of vindication rather than eternal tragedy.

But in

the essential locus, he is exactly like Schweitzer, for his universe is
closed to grace.
acts.

Moltmann's God is a God who will act, not a God who

Grace is a future noumenon, not a present phenomenon.

It is a

crippled grace, a demythologized grace, a helping of those who help
themselves, even if it is not a crass, materialistic self-helping.
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This writer has used the word "anthropotheistic" to describe Moltrnann' s theology.

We ought to understand by this term that Moltmann 's

God is impersonal; either He is the historical process itself, or He is
noumenal, but so remote that He can be apprehended only within the historical process.

This is not Christian because, as was stated above,

the burden for producing the eschaton is laid upon the human conscience,
and no real grace is connnunicated through the promise.
But Moltma.nn's work need not be in vain.

The Law of God needs to

be proclaimed in every age, and much of Moltmann's material proclaims
it well, when grace and the hope of heaven are then used properly to
console, regenerate, and equip the hearer, then a genuine Church can
be cultivated which will be on its way to the Kingdom of glory.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Moltman, J~rgen. Theologie der Hoffnung. Munchen: (.;hr. Kaiser
Verlag, 1964.
- - - - -. Theology of Hope. Translated by James W. Leitch.
New York: Harper and Row, 1967.
Books
Capps, Walter. Time Invades the Cathedral. Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1972.
Collingwood, Robin George. The ldea of History. Ox.ford: Clarendon
Press, 1

'4'.

Niebuhr, Richard Reinhold. Resurrection and Historical Reason.
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957.
Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Theology and the Kingdom of God. Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1,6~.
Russell, D.S. The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic.
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 19,4.
Rust, Eric G. Towards a Theological Understanding of History.
New York: Ox.ford University Press, 19G3.
Articles in Collections
Aldwinckle, R. F. "Did Jesus Believe in God? Some Reflections on
Christian Atheism," New Theology No. 5. Edited by Martin
Marty and Dean Peerman. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968.
Bloch, Ernst. "Christ or the Uncovered Countenance." Translated by
E. B. Ashton, in Man On His Own,. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970.
11
Incipit Vite, N2n•" 'rranslated by ~- B. Ashton, in Man
On His Own. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970.

-. "Religious Truth," Translated by John Cumming, in Man
On. His Own. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970.

Bultmann, Rudolf. "New Testament and Jtrthology" Kerygma. and lfrth.
Edited by Hans Werner Bartsch. New York: Harper and Row, 1~,1.
- - -. "A Reply to the Theses of Julius Schniewind," Kerygma.
and }1yth. :Edited by Hans Werner Bartsch. New York: Harper and
Row, 19&1.
Cobb, John. "A New Trio Arises in Europe, 11 New Theology No 2 5.

Edited by Martin Marty and Dean Peerman. New York: The Macmillan
Company,

1,,a.

Goppelt, Leonard. "The Easter Kerygma in the New Testament," The
Easter Message for Today. Translated by Salvator Attanasio
and Da.I'l'ell L. Guder. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1,64.
Hordeni, William. "Introduction," New Directions in Theology Today I.
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1,&6.
Kadai, Heino. "Hi.story and Hermeneutics, 11 A Project in Biblical
Hermeneutics. Commission on Theology and Church Relations,
The Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod,

1,,,.

5. Edited
'by Martin Marty and Dean Peerman. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 19'8.

Keen, Samuel. "Hope in a Posthuman Era," New Theology No,

Marsch, Wolf-Dieter. "Zur Einleitung: Wohin- - jenseits der
Alteniativen," Diskussion uber die 11Theologie der Hoffnung."
M..inchen: Christian Kaiser Verlag,

1,,7.

~tz, Johannes. "Creative Hope," New Theology No. 5. :Edited by
Martin Marty and Dean Peennan. New York: The M!.cmillan Company,

1,'8.
Moltmann, Jurgen. "The Future as Threat and Opportunity9 " Translated
by Shierry Weaer. The Religious Situation. Edited by Donald R.
Cutler. Boston: Beacon Press,

1,,,.

- - -. "Introduction," Man on His 6wn. New York: Herder and
Herder, 1,10.
Niebuhr, Richard Reinhold. "Archegos," Christian Hi.story and
Interpretation. Edited by W.R. Farmer, et al. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1,6?.
Neuhaus, Richard John. "Wolfhart Pannenberg: Profile of a Theologian,"
Theology and the Kingdom of God. Philadelphia: Westminster Press,

1,,,.

117
Pannenberg, i-Jolfhart. 11 Redemptive Event and History, 11 Translated
by Shirley Guthrie. Essays on Old Testament Hermeneutics. Edited
by Claus Westermann. Richmond: John Knox Press, 1%6.

Thielicke, Helmut. "The Resurrection Kerygma, 11 'Ihe Easter l1iessage
for. Today. Translated by Salvator Attanasio and Varrell L. Guder.
New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1964.
Zirrunerli, Walther. "Promise and Fulfillment." Translated by James
Wharton. Essays on Old Testament Hermeneutics. Edited by Glaus
Westermann. Richmond: John Knox Press, 196,.
Periodical Literature
Braaten, Carl E. "Toward a Theology of Hope, 11 Theology Today,
XXIII (July 19&7), 208-22G.
Dymale, Herbert. 11 i-lhat Kind of Hope is Adequate?," Christianity
Today,~ (June 18, 1~71), ~-10 (877-878).

Hiers, Richard. "Eschatology and Methodology," Journal of
Biblical Literature, LXXXV, no. 2 (196,), 170-184.
Kaufman, Gordon. 11 'l'heological Historicism as an Experiment in
Thought," Christian Century, LXXXIII (March 2, 1,6,), 268-271.
Mildenberger, F. 11 Auferstanden am dritten Tag nach den Schri~en, 11
Evangelische Theologie, XXIII (19,3), 2,5-27~.
Moltmann, Jurgen. "Ex!'gese und Eschatologie der Geschichte, 11
Evangelische 'l'heologie, XXII (1962), 31-6'>.
-

The Realism of Hope: The Feast of the Resurrection
and the Transformation of the Present Reality. 11 Translated
by _G ilbert A. Thiele. Concordia Theological Monthly, XL
(March 1969), 14~-155.
-

-.

11

- - -. "Toward a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel,"
Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XXIII, no. 4 (1,68),

303-323.
Pannenberg, Wolfhart. 11 The Kingdom of God and the Fonda tion of
Ethics," Una Sancta, xm, no. 2 (1968), 6-26.
Scharlemann, Martin. "Hermeneutic (S),
Monthly, XX.XIX (1,68), 612-622.

11

Concordia

1

heological

